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CHAIRMAN KEENE:

Good morning ladies and gentlemen.

This is a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing -- the meeting
of the Senate Judiciary Committee on SCA 10 and related matters.
The requirement of unanimity in criminal jury verdicts
is a long-standing common law tradition and is nearly universally a part of the American system of justice.

All but

five states require unanimity in misdemeanor trials.
but two states require unanimity in felony trials.

All
At the

federal level, all verdicts must be unanimous in all criminal cases.
Since 1879 the California Constitution has provided criminal defendants with a right to trial by jury, and that has
been interpreted consistently to require unanimous jury verdicts in all criminal cases.

SCA 10 proposes to amend our

Constitution to allow a non-unanimous five-sixth verdict in
any non-capital criminal case.
The United States Supreme Court has found no federal
constitutional bar to having states use non-unanimous juries
in criminal cases.

Obviously it does not follow that because

it is allowed that we should adopt the proposal.

Rather the

proponents of the measure have the obligation of demonstrating why we should abandon the unanimous jury which has always
been a basic part of our judicial system and which has been
considered one of the bulwarks of American freedom.

They have

a heavy burden of proof; a tradition as basic as the unanimous jury should not be cast aside lightly.
In particular we need to know the effects that SCA 10
would have on the jury system.
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Would it resu.lt in speedier

trials, with fewer hung juries and more convictions and acquitals?

Would it affect jury behavior and curtail full

deliberations?

What impact would it have on minority group

representation on juries?

And would it lead to greater num-

bers of filings by prosecutors?

These are some of the

questions this committee, and ultimately the voters of California, will have to ask and have answered.

It may well be

that hung juries are a fact of life, rather than a consequence
that is avoidable, and there may not be a solution to the
problem short of abolishing the jury.
The purpose of this interim hearing then is to see
whether the proponents' burdens can be met.

Before beginning,

let me note that the hearing is on SCA 10 and not on the
"Criminal Courts Procedures" initiative, which is also supported by some proponents of SCA 10.

Therefore, I would en-

courage all the witnesses to speak to SCA 10 and if necessary
to allude to the initiative but to keep it within limits of
reasonable restraint.
The first witness, and we are very pleased to have you,
is Robert Philibosian, the District Attorney of Los Angeles
County.
MR. PHILIBOSIAN:

Senator Keene, Senator Presley and

members of the staff, thank you very much for inviting me to
participate in your hearing this morning.

I am the sponsor

of SCA 10 with Senator Bob Presley as the author.
SCA 10 does not have as its goal more convictions, first
of all.

Its goal is to speed up the justice process by eli-

minating retrials in cases where juries have hung by a 11 to
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1, or 10 to 2.

We have found that in almost every single

case where there has been a verdict of 11 to 1 or 10 to 2
the holdout juror or jurors have expressed op

ions to other

members of the jury which have little or nothing to do with
the facts or the law as stated by the judge.

We find parti-

cularly in sexual assault cases that -- and we had one case
in this county that went to trial four times. having hung 11
to 1 three of those times -- in sexual assault cases we have
found that jurors sometimes harbor some of these old myths
about rape, and do not divulge that information on voir dire,
no matter how lengthy or how expert the voir dire is.
Holding those prejudices, those old myths about rape
and reactions, or what should be the reactions of a woman in
that type of a situation, we have found on many occasions
that we have had to retry sexual assault cases, in effect
retraumatize the rape victims, who has once been traumatized
by the crime; again traumatized at the preliminary hearing;
again traumatized at the trial.

She must be traumatized at

a retrial because one or two jurors harbor these old myths
these old prejudicies about rape.

That's just an example.

Judge Ideman, who is going to testify after me, has a
statement from Judge Ronald George with another particularly
poignant illustration of what happens when one juror stymies
the efforts of the remainder of the jury for reasons that
really have nothing whatsoever to do with the facts or with
the evidence.

In Los Angeles County over the past two years

approximately 15% of the felony trials have gone to hung
juries.

We estimate -- although we do not have the exact
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figures -- we estimate that in approximately one-half of
those cases -- so we can say about 7-1/2% overall -- juries
have been hung 10 to 2 or 11 to 1 for guilty.

Although the

numbers are small, comparatively, to the overall numbers of
cases tried, when we think of the trauma to those victims
who must be retraumatized; when we think of the inconvenience
to the witnesses who must be recalled; when we think of the
expense to the county which must go through another trial;
when we think of the court time taken for that case, which is
then not available for other cases or for civil cases, we are
talking about a substantial expenditure of time, money and
human emotions.

It is to save that time, that money, and

those human emotions that we have proposed this legislation.
You spoke, Senator Keene, of the long tradition of the
unanimous jury verdict.

I think it is helpful to outline

very briefly the origin of the unanimous jury verdict.

The

origin of the unanimous jury verdict was in medieval England
when the only people who could serve on a jury were people
who had actual knowledge of the crime itself.

We have gone

totally away from that particular part of the tradition, so
that now people who serve on the jury may not expressly have
any knowledge of the crime itself.

So, we can see that one-

half of that tradition is gone and we are left with the other
half of the tradition.
makes any sense.

The half we are left with no longer

No decisions are made in this country, or

anywhere in the free world, by unanimous decision.

Our Cali-

fornia Supreme Court decides matters of life and death by 4
to 3.

The U. S. Superme Court decides matters of life and
-4-

death by 5 to 4.

The existence of that tradition at this

point in time no longer has any use in actual procedural -in any necessily for procedure.

Additionally, you ask that we limit our comments on
the Criminal Court Reform Initiative, and I'm going to limit
my comments, except to say that this is a part of Criminal
Court Reform Initiative and to tell you that a poll was conducted in Los Angeles County about six weeks ago.

It was

conducted by DMI, which is a nationwide, nationally known
polling organization.

They conducted a countywide scienti-

fic poll, conducted just the same as a poll for, say, a
presidential candidacy would be conducted, and they found,
asking the question of a ballot proposition, setting forth
a jury verdict of 10 to 2 or 11 to 1 -- asking the public
whether they would be in favor or opposed to that particular
ballot provision -- 72% of the respondents said that they
would be in favor of a jury verdict of 10 to 2 or 11 to 1
72% in favor.

I have not heard of any ballot proposition or

any candidate who has had such a landslide, either in a vote
or in a poll.

So, I think that lays to rest the concerns of

anyone that the public -- the voters, the taxpayers -- will not
be accepting of such a provision in the California Constitution.

This poll, conducted in Los Angeles County, crossed

all sections geographically.

The results were no different

in one geographic area than in another.

The results were no

different based on ethnic or racial lines.

The results were

no different based on the gender of the respondent. The
composite and the individual parts remain very closely the
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same; the composite was 72% in favor.

So, I think that is

very significant to a Legislature that is a representative
Legislature, and seeks to respond to the will of the people.
Thank you very much.
CHAIRMAN:

Thank you.

If you would stay with us and

respond to questions I would appreciate it.
MR. PHILIBOSIAN:
CHAIRMAN:

I would be happy to do so.

Are there any questions by a member of the

committee -- two members of the committee.

Senator Davis

first.
SENATOR DAVIS: Mr. Philibosian, I can support the concept if I have a feeling that there will be no diminution
of justice to an individual and if it makes the process more
efficient.

In other words, I think that we now win 90 some

percent of cases that the District Attorney files, probably
in general, and a very high percentage of the jury trials.
If this preserves the ability of an innocent person to go
free, and doesn't materially disturb the percentage of convictions, but doesn't require us going into additional trials,
because of hung juries, this is probably a good idea.

Is

there any data on states that have employed this, and what
impact it had on the percentage of convictions?
MR. PHILIBOSIAN:

There doesn't seem to be any impact

on the percentage of convictions, and there is no public outcry in the states of Louisiana and Oregon against this particular procedure.

The United States Supreme Court says that

jury verdicts of 9 to 3 are acceptable under the United States
Constitution.

I'm willing to accept the finding of the United
-6-

States Supreme Court that there is no diminution of defendants' rights, because they have specifically found that.
SENATOR DAVIS:

In those two states it has not mater-

ially increased the conviction percentage that prosecutors
get?
MR. PHILIBOSIAN:
SENATOR DAVIS:
MR. PHILIBOSIAN:

No.

Not that I am aware of.

Now, has it materially .....
We are not seeking to increase rate

of convictions, Senator.
SENATOR DAVIS:

OK.

That's what I want to make clear.

I'm for more expedient justice as long as it's still justice.
Has there been evidence that it has reduced the amount of
time that courts and prosecutors, and everyone else involved
in the process, are engaged in it?
MR. PHILIBOSIAN:

I'm not aware of any specific studies

in those states that reflect that.

I simply earlier, I think,

before you arrived, quoted the statistic that 15% of the jury
trials -- criminal jury trials in Los Angeles County -- result in hung juries.

Our estimate, although we do not have

the actual figures, our estimate is about half of that 15%
or about 7-1/2% overall -- are hung 11 to 1 or 10 to 2 for
guilty, and it is those cases which we seek to avoid retrying,
avoid retraumatizing those victims, and having the witnesses
come forward again, and to save the expense of time involved.
CHAIRMAN KEENE:
SENATOR PRESLEY:

Senator Presley.
Mr. Chairman, you indicate the pro-

ponents of this bill, and I certainly am one, as the author,
and I am very strongly in support of this concept and change
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in the Constitution; and you indicated that the burden of
proof was on us very strongly to prove that.
about the 72%.

I didn't know

I'm very glad to hear that number one, the

exhibit of proof -- the burden of proof is on us.

The peo-

ple out there that this affects strongly support it, and if
it does get through the Legislature and on the ballot, there
is a strong assumption that it will

pass~

The other point I want to make is that, in terms of burden of proof, I know that analysis was written somewhere
along the line when SCA 10 was introduced last February, that
says support unknown, and I don't quite know why we weren't
ahlc to identify the support for this bill, because they cer-

tainly haven't been in the closet.

Mr. Philibosian, would

you enumerate for us, for the record, the groups that, to
your knowledge, are in support of the bill.
MR. PHILIBOSIAN:

Well, to my knowledge the California

District Attorneys Association; the State Chamber of Commerce;
the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce; State Sheriff's Association; California Peace Officers Association.
whether the State Chiefs have gone on record.

I'm not sure
Have they?

Yes, they have -- California Police Chiefs Association.

All

of those groups are in favor; numerous individuals including
myself, Judge Ronald George, speaking for himself, but he
is the former President of the California Judges Association;
and the current Supervising Judge of Criminal Departments in
Los Angeles County Superior Court; Judge Jim Ideman, who is
here, who is the Assistant Supervising Judge for Criminal Departments, and speaking for himself, but certainly an individual
worthy of note.

The Sheriff of Los Angeles County, Sherman
-A-

Block, who will be here later this morning to testify before this committee.

So, there are a number of proponent

groups and proponent individuals.
SENATOR PRESLEY:

Mr. Chairman, also by what date --

this is a Constitutional Amendment, so we are not stuck with
a date, are we, in January?
CHAIRMAN KEENE:

I think the only date depends on which

ballot one would contemplate putting it on.

There is some

period in advance of that by which the Secretary of State
has to have knowledge that it has passed the Legislature.
We can check that for you, unless staff knows.
MR. THOMSON:

There is no legislative deadline because

it's a Constitutional Amendment.
SENATOR PRESLEY:

All right, we will just have to de-

termine which election we are headed for, primary or general, and try to have it heard in sufficient time before the
committee.
MR. PHILIBOSIAN:
with one statement.

Let me just, if I may, wrap up a bit
Parenthetically I will supply to this

committee an excerpt from the poll, which shows the percentages.

I'll bring that in later this morning.

But, just to

kind of wrap up in terms of placing this on the ballot, I
think regardless of the individual thoughts or philosophies
of the members of the committee, I think that certainly the
people of the state should have the opportunity to vote on
this particular Constitutional Amendment.

We have seen in

one county -- Los Angeles County, which is a fairly represenatative county of the state -- an overwhelming number of
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voters who are in favor of this particular legislation, this
particular amendment, I think that the voters should have the
opportunity to make this choice, to express their will.

If

they vote in favor of it, it becomes part of our Constitution;
if they vote against it then the proponents are wrong in
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thinking that this is what the public wants and we will fold
our tents and will go away.

But, I would urge that this com-

mittee pass this bill out so that it may be out before the
voters so we may hear the will of the people.
CHAIRMAN:
put to you.

I have a couple of questions I would like to

The first is how much weight we ought to give

to the poll.

Do you believe that the public that was polled

was adequately informed about the issue and the implications
of reducing the unanimous verdict to something less than that?
MR. PHILIBOSIAN:

Well, as there is in any poll, Sena-

tor, one asks the question; one doesn't go through a lengthy
discussion of the merits or demerits; proponents or opponents;
the pluses and minuses; one simply asks the question and receives a response from the electorate.

If it were close

if it were 51 to 49%, then perhaps we could say that an educational campaign would perhaps sway the opponents or the
proponents among the public.

But, when we have such an over-

whelming response, I doubt whether any educational campaign
would change that kind of a response -- would turn it around
completely.

I think people are generally aware; we have a

very well informed electorate in Los Angeles County.

These

issues have been before the public .....
CHAIRMAN:

They are not here today, however.

to be informed by testimony such as yours.

I'm here

The other members

of the committee are here; there are a few people out here in
the audience, but the great bulk of the people are not really
paying a great deal of attention to the issue.

My own sus-

picion is that they are concerned about crime, legitimately,
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and anything that they believe would tend to reduce the amount
of crime in our society they would go for without necessarily being aware of all the implications. So, our judgment may or may not be the same as that of the public at
large for which we get criticized constantly.

But, I'm a

Legislator who tends to believe that they buy into our judgment as well as representation of what the polls show.

Now

I don't know if an educational process will change that, and
I certainly -- it may make the statistics even more overwhelming in favor of adoption of this kind of thing.

But,

I think it is a necessary part of the process, and I'm not
sure the early polls ought to be relied upon to that extent.
We may differ in that respect.
my views are.

I just want you to know what

This is an important issue and we need to re-

flect honestly on the issue.
MR. PHILIBOSIAN:
six weeks ago.

Well, this poll was taken approximately

This issue has been in the newspapers, on

television, on radio; it has been debated; the County Bar has
taken a position; there have been editorials one way or
another in the electronic media, as well as the print media;
various public officials have been speaking about it.

It's

not an issue that has never before been discussed in public.
I think it's also interesting to note, based on your comment
that the people would be in favor of anything that they
thought would reduce crime.

In the same poll the public was

asked whether or not they would be in favor of judicial voir
dire -- which is another amendment that I have proposed, and
is also part of the initiative which was heard by this com-11-

mittee -- and whether or not they would be in favor of the
full restoration of the Grand Jury process, again which is
Senator Davis' SCA 6 and is part of the initiative.

Al-

though the people were in favor of both of those separate
propositions, the amount in favor was not as great as the
amount in favor on this particular proposition.

So, the

public differentiated in this area, and although they may
have perceived that all three of those procedures would do
something about the crime problem, as you say, they differentiated between those two which were relatively close in
percentage, and this which was much higher in percentage.
I will supply all of those figures to this committee later
this morning.
CHAIRMAN:

Also the questions that were put to the

public.
MR. PHILIBOSIAN:

Yes.

I will supply the question and

the percentage of responses in each of those areas.

I think

it is also interesting to note that there is one question
that was asked of the public, whether or not their response
would be changed if the State Bar Association indicated opposition, and an overwhelming majority said if the Bar was
opposed they would be in favor.
CHAIRMAN:

No comment.

}fR. PHILIBOSIAN:

CHAIRMAN:

No. No.

What percentage .....

Something like 66%.
This is a different question.

You

indicated that approximately -- or I think you had data to
show that about 15% of the felonies resulted in hung juries?
MR. PHILIBOSIAN:

Yes.

That is a statistic from the

Executive Officer of the Courts.
-12-

CHAIPJ1AN:

In California?

MR. PHILIBOSIAN:
CHAIRMAN:

No, in Los Angeles

Oh, in Los Angeles County.

MR. PHILIBOSIAN:

That's Los Angeles

I don't

have a statewide figure for you.
CHAIID,Ulli:

15% of the felonies in Los Angeles County re-

sult in hung juries.

What percentage of the misdemeanors?

Do you have any idea?
MR. PHILIBOSIAN:

They don't have statistics on mis-

demeanors.
CHAIRMAN:

They don't?

What percentage of the cases

are hung 11 to 1?
MR. PHILIBOSIAN:
kept.

We don't

those figures are not

Our best estimate, based on discussions with our pro-

secutors, who have had hung juries, is approximately half
of the hung juries are hung 11 to 1 or 10 to 2 for guilty.
CHAIRMAN:

What is the empirical basis for that -- the

estimated half?
MR. PHILIBOSIAN:
CHAIRMAN:

There is none.

So, the prosecutors say well, about half of

them hang up.
MR. PHILIBOSIAN:

Half of the ones who hang up hang

11 to 1 or 10 to 2 for guilty.

It is those cases that we are

going after, where 10 or 11 people are convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, and one or two
hold out, usually for reasons that have nothing to do with
law or nothing to do with evidence.
CHAIRMAN:

If this is an issue that has been before the
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public for some period of time, wouldn't it be useful to have
statistics and to know whether that estimate is anywhere near
to correct, and not just an impression, so

t we could

know what percentage of the cases hang up at 11 to 1 and 10
to 2?
MR. PHILIBOSIAN:

Those statistics have not been kept.

It's almost impossible to go back and try to reconstruct them
at this point in time.
CHAIRMAN:

But couldn't we start keeping them?

Shouldn't

we have started .....
MR. PHILIBOSIAN:
CHAIRMAN:

Yes, and we are.

Can't we start for a year before you .....

MR. PHILIBOSIAN:
CHAIRMAN:

No.

We haven't.

You don't need the data that badly?

MR. PHILIBOSIAN:
CHAIID1AN:

No.

Well, it hasn't been done.

Let me ask you another question.

I have been

trying to reflect on this issue without a great deal of advance prejudice simply based on the institution and the fact
that we've used unanimous in California since the 1879 Constitution, at least.

It strikes me that you can have an

obstinate person, a corrupt individual; you can have an individual who is so narrow-minded on a jury that that individual
will never be persuaded by the others, no matter how persuasive their arguments
myths held about a rape.

you gave the rape case and the
I understand all that.

I suppose

that happens a certain percentage of the time and because we
don't really have empirical data, but just impressions, I
don't know what percentage of the time that is.
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But, if it's

1 in 100 times -- 100 jurors -- you get one of those, the
prospect of getting two of those on the same jury is going
to be 1 in 10,000 -- 100 times 100.

Now, if we go after

1 in 100 situation, why do we also have to go after the 1 in
10,000 situation?

Why do we have to allow a 10-2?

Why

couldn't we just move to an 11-1 and to take care of that
situation where you have a juror who simply won't be convinced no matter what the evidence shows?
MR. PHILIBOSIAN:
tion, Senator.

10-2 is already a compromise

posi-

The United States Supreme Court says 9 to

3 is sufficient.
CHAIR}~N:

I'm not talking law or politics, I'm talking

public policy now.

Why do we have to take care of that all

too rare situation, where you have two jurors on the same
jury, who are thought to be obstinate, corrupt, or unable
to be persuaded by reason?
MR. PHILIBOSIAN:

Because generally our finding is that

it's not more than two, but it is two more often-- it's two
more often than three, let's put it that way.

It's one more

often than two, and we are seeking to alleviate the problem
in one fell swoop in effect.

If we run into situations where

two people are hanging up the jury, then we want to take care
of that also.

And those are the situations which would be

far more common than three.

We feel we are on very safe con-

stitutional grounds because of the United States Supreme
Court decision.
CHAIRMAN:

So, it's already a compromise position.
It is a compromise, I guess, but I wonder if

it's a compromise in the best interest of justice.
-15-

I agree

with you that you can get that individual who screws up the
process a certain percentage of the time, and that percentage may be -- I don't know how high it is.

But, the pro-

spect of getting two seems to me is infinitely less, and the
prospect of getting three is far, far less than that
small that you wouldn't need to worry about it
we are moving to a 10 to 2.
thing to do at this point.

--

so

-- and yet

I don't think that's the right
If we are going to change the

institution, if we're going to change the structure, it seems
to me that we ought to change it in the direction of 11-1.
And if empirically we can show that there are enough problems
to justify that, I'm willing to support it.

I horrified some

of the local community when I first took over this chairmanship and said we ought to consider that.
to consider that.

I think we ought

The 10 to 2 does trouble me.

I just want you

to know again what my views are on the thing.
MR. PHILIBOSIAN:

Of course 9 to 3 is based on the

civil jury which makes a decision 9 to 3, and with only a
preponderance of the evidence -- far less than beyond a
reasonable doubt.
CHAIRMAN:

That's the basis of 9 to 3.

~Je

do a lot of things by simple majority in

the State of California and in the country.

Imposing taxes

is not one of them in California that we do by a simple majority anymore.

The analogies though to the California

Supreme Court, which functions on a simple majority basis
4 to 3, or the U. S. Supreme Court 5 to 4 -- I don't think
are necessarily good analogies, because at least under the
constitutional theory they are supposed to be resolving
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legal issues -- disputes about the law, not disputes about
facts, and the laggeries that decide these disputes about
facts are in different situations, because factual questions
perhaps ought to require a higher majority.
allow for a higher majority in a 10 to 2.

And you do
But, I'm not sure

that that's the right break off point, and I'm not sure the
analogy holds.

We have a group in society that simply ques-

tions the fact or makes public policy, or something like
that.

We do believe in majority rule, because the factual

determination that they make is indelible; it's final and
it's rare that an appellate court will overturn something
on the lack of evidence to come to that conclusion.

So, I

think we need to be careful in this area that we don't draw
on

wrong analogies.
I'm sorry, I didn't mean to get into that much speech-

making this morning, but I wanted to share my views with
you at this stage, and I'm willing to be persuaded, and I'm
willing to move in the direction that you would like to move
in.

I'm not sure I would like to move as fast and as far

as you would like to go, even though you indicate you are not
moving as far and as fast as you could move.

Thank you very

much.
MR. PHILIBOSIAN:
CHAIRMAN:

Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Davis.

SENATOR DAVIS:

I would just like to say at this point,

I'm very happy that you are the District Attorney of Los
Angeles County.
CHAIRMAN:

Judge James Ideman.
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Nice to have you with

us, although I must admit as a former classmate of Judge Ron
George, I would have been happy to see him this morning as
well.
JUDGE IDEMAN:

Well, he regrets very much that he can-

not be here, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, Senator Davis,

Senator Presley.
CHAIRMAN KEENE:

He is becoming a morning television

personality, I understand.
JUDGE IDEMAN:

Yes, he has.

I watched him on TV.

He

wasn't on very long, if you happened to .....
CHAIRMAN KEENE:

I heard about it.

I missed it.

I

wish I had been able to catch it.
JUDGE IDEMAN:

I have a statement from Judge George

which I would like to read to the committee, with your permission.

I am also here on my own behalf and I will have

something to say after I read Judge George's statement.
"I regret having been called out of town and being unable to attend this hearing, but I wish to endorse wholeheartedly the provisions of SCA 10, which would permit
conviction in non-capital criminal cases by a 10 to 2 or 11
to 1 vote, apart from the unanimous vote presently required.
This is a statement of my personal position, and is not intended to represent the position of the court.

In my exper-

ience the one or two holdout jurors for aquittal and a hung
jury typically are individuals who refuse to deliberate with
their fellow jurors and who have preconceived biases precluding the giving of any consideration to a conviction in the
case before them.
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"A typical example reported in the attached clippings
from the October 5, 1983 editions of the Los Angeles Times
and the Los Angeles Herald Examiner involved a federal prosecution in Los Angeles arising out of a large-scale international child pornography operation.
holdout juror sabotaged the case.

A solitary, unreasonable

The juror who deadlocked

the jury with the only not guilty vote, is described in the
articles as having appeared not to listen to most of the
testimony, and having admitted not hearing any of the tape
recordings.

The holdout juror announced almost immediately

after the case was submitted to the jury that he would never
vote for a conviction.

He referred to defense witnesses, who

did not testify, and stated that all law enforcement officers
are liars, indicating, 'I didn't want to be on this jury to
start with,' and 'let another jury convict her.'

According

to other jurors the holdout juror 'sat in a chair, his back
to the other 11 reading a book. '"
CHAIRMAN:

Isn't that an argument against changing voir

dire?
JUDGE IDEYUU1:

I have a remark too about that myself.

I'm also here in my own capacity, again not purporting to
represent the views of members of my court.

So, my back-

ground may be of some interest to the committee.
Prior to my election to the Bench I was for 15 years a
deputy district attorney in Los Angeles County; I was never
an administrator; I was always a trial lawyer.

I've been

five years on the Bench assigned to the Criminal Division,
so I've been trying criminal cases for 20 years in Los Angeles
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County.

I'm also a Colonel in the United States Army Re-

serve, in the Judge Advocate General Corps.
city I serve as a

~1ilitary

In that capa-

Judge, and I go on active duty

two weeks a year, usually to Ford Ord where I try cases by
court-martial.

With regard to the latter, the Army and the

other Uniformed Services, for years have had a lack of unanimity requirement for verdicts -- two-thirds in cases where
the possible punishment is under ten years, and three-quarters
for cases where punishment is over ten years -- unanimous
for capital cases only.

Although the Uniformed Services in

recent years have added substantial protections to the rights
of the accused, this is one thing that is never tampered
with.

It works fine in the military.

I realize a court-

martial is not the same as a civilian criminal trial, but
there are important similarities, and in the end it's the
question of whether or not the guilt of an individual is
proved

beyond a reasonable doubt.

With respect to my service as a trial lawyer and as a
judge, I have tried hundreds of jury trials myself, both as
a lawyer and as a judge.

And being in the business one tends

to discuss other cases with one's colleagues, both other
trial lawyers and now other judges, and so one's experience
is beyond the particular cases that we've tried ourselves.
But it's only really expanded by the trials that other people
have participated in.

And I cannot remember in all of the

20 years that I've been in the Criminal Justice System
wherever it was felt by the lawyer or the judge involved
in the case that an 11 to 1 holdout juror did so for any
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rational basis.

In every case that I can remember, it was

a case like the one cited by Judge George -- someone put his
back to the others, folded his arms, and

d,

when you are ready to acquit, I'm not going to

11

Let me know
anything

to do with the case."
By chance, and only by chance, I was the Trial Judge in
the case referred to by Mr. Philibosian where the defendant
was tried four times and ultimately freed.

I would like to

take a moment to tell you about that case.

This was a case

in which a young woman was with her fiance in Hollywood celebrating, I believe, their engagement.

They had been to an

Italian restaurant; they left the restaurant about 11:00
o'clock, and they went to get the car, which was parked in
a parking lot.

They were accosted by four men who beat up

the boyfriend, and left him bleeding and robbed on the ground
of the parking lot -- took his wallet and his property.

They

opened the trunk of their Cadillac; they threw the young lady
into the trunk of the Cadillac and drove off with her to a
distance of several miles to an alley somewhere in Los Angeles,
where she was repeatedly gang raped and sodomized, and forced
to submit to oral copulation.

The main offender, the indi-

vidual that Mr. Philibosian referred to, then took her to a
motel where he continued to rape her throughout the night,
ignoring the pounding of his confederates who were banging
on the door to the motel room -- they were angry because they
were being denied their turn by this defendant.
the four were apprehended.

Three of

Two of the three pled guilty be-

fore me in a negotiated disposition for 12 years in prison,
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which is what they got.
four times.

The main offender went to trial

The first time he was tried was before me and

the jury was 11 to l

for c

L

The

vidence on the

defense side was that the lady had, upon seeing the four
men and seeing them beat up the boyfriend -- the boyfriend
had made some remark to them, so that's why he was beaten-the robbery was denied -- and upon seeing her fiance lying
bleeding on the parking lot, she told the men that she had
always desired to have sex with strangers, and crawled willingly into the trunk of the car, and then went down to
wherever they took her and willingly participated with all
of these people.

It was a very implausible defense.

The

argument made to the jury was along racial lines, that there
was talk about and illusions to lynchings in the South where
a white woman would accuse a black man of rape, and so forth,
and it reached its mark, and one juror, for reasons described
by the other jurors as being completely irrational, refused
to participate in the case, voted for not guilty, 11 to 1.
The second time he went to trial was before another
judge -- Judge Jerry Fields of our Court.

I wasn't avail-

able at that time -- on the same evidence and that jury -same argument -- and that jury hung up 11 to 1 for the same
reason.
The case then came back to me for a third trial, and by
this time the victim was weakening.

The attorney then would

read portions of her preliminary hearing testimony and read
testimony from the f

st two trials, and obviously there was
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some discrepancy every time a person testifies, and the jury
also gets to know that there had been two tr
this case hung up 9 to 3.

s before. So,

I thought the case was so aggra-

vated and such a miscarriage of justice was occurring that
I decided to order an unprecedented fourth trial.

Nobody

that I have talked to in our business has known of a case
that has been tried four times.

Usually two is about it,

and three for a case that is especially heinous or serious.
Well, I thought this case should be tried a fourth time.
It went to another judge -- I again was not available

and this time the victim was really wearing down.

This was her fifth time to present this testimony.
jury hung up also.

And that

I think that jury was something like 7

to 5, and the case was dismissed and the main culprit is a
free man today.

Had we had SCA 10 he would be making license

plates well into the next century.
CHAIPMAN KEENE:

What if we had provision for an 11 to

1 verdict?
JUDGE IDEMAN:
tion.

That would have taken care of the situa-

So, I can say that, based on my experience in the

civilian legal side, the military legal side, that I think
SCA 10 is an idea whose time has really come.
One other point.

There is a great expenditure and waste

of public funds now in very lengthy voir dire proceedings
very, very lengthy questioning of jurors and far too many
peremptory challenges are permitted.
CHAIRMAN:

Wouldn't that fellow in the first trial have

been weeded out if the voir dire had been properly imple-
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mented, they would have found out that he did not want to
serve on the jury.
JUDGE IDEMAN:

Well, no.

There was very extensive voir

dire in all the trials, and this voir dire failed to disclose this type of feeling by this person.

Obviously the

prosecutor who was a very talented Deputy District Attorney
one of the best in the office.

She now heads up, I believe,

the sexual assault program for the DA's office-- top attorney and she was unable to see this .....
CHAIRMAN:

The connection I can't make is that he will-

ingly admitted after the jury hung up -- he said, "I never
wanted to serve on this jury in the first place."

Is that

something .....
JUDGE IDEMAN:
I read you.

No, that was Judge George's case that

That was a child pornography jury.

CHAIRMAN:

Oh.

JUDGE IDEMAN:

OK.
The jurors in this case apparently were

put off by racial feeling.
CHAIRMAN:

Which were not able to be disclosed --

JUDGE IDEMAN:

They were not able to be disclosed.

There was question about those feelings, but it didn't turn
up, and the juror was permitted to serve in each case.
CHAIRMAN:

Yet, you know that was the basis for the

judgment of the holdouts.
JUDGE IDEMAN:

Oh, yes, because the other jurors were

quite incensed by it and spoke to the attorneys afterwards.
Now, the last point I would like to make is this.

A

lot of time is now wasted in extensive voir dire and many
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peremptory challenges.

One of the justifications for very,

very careful voir dire, and for the use of many peremptory
challenges is attempting to weed out the type of person that
would arbitrarily hang up a jury, and I know there are other
moves afoot to cut down on voir dire, and cut down on peremptories, and this seems to me to dovetail nicely because
if you don't have to worry that much about the one odd or
the two odd people that will irrationally hang up a jury,
then the reason for extensive voir dire, and the reason for
a large number of peremptory challenges also is ameliorated.
So, I think that the savings would be far beyond the conviction of people who would have gotten off on 11 to 1 or
10 to 2 verdicts before.

Thank you.

I'll be happy tore-

spond to any questions.
CHAIRMAN:

Thank you.

Any questions by members of the

committee of Judge Ideman?

Thank you very much.

very interesting and informative.

Please say

11

That was

hello" to

Judge George for me.
JUDGE

IDEl~N:

CHAIRMAN:

I shall.

Professor Alan Scheflin.

PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN:

Mr. Chairman, members of the com-

mittee, I appreciate the opportunity to be called here to
testify in reference to this proposed amendment to the California Constitution.

I have written extensively on juries

and have been quoted in court opinions and by judges and
speeches; I've often been a consultant on jury issues.

Per-

haps my expertise here is based on my having authored chapters
on non-unanimous jury verdicts and jury selection procedures,
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a book that I understand has been basic to the thinking
of your staff counsel.
What T propose Lo do is Lo t:llk nhouL the history and
the considerations involved in non-unanimous jury verdicts.
Let me start by saying that juries in criminal cases have
decided unanimous jury verdicts for over 600 years with very
few moments in time as exceptions.

Therefore, the gravity

of the proposal that we consider today seems to me is fairly
obvious.

I appreciate the opportunity to be heard for that

reason.
When we turn to history we find a number of arguments,
none unfortunately compelling as to the unanimity requirement.
Unfortunately the history of the unanimity rule is shrouded
in mystery, and of the many different theories virtually none
of them apply to the legal procedures that we have today.
We know this at least, that the right to a jury is a sacred
right, starts in 1215 with the Magna Carta, and that by 1367
all experiments with non-unanimous juries were repealed and
the unanimity requirement became the law of the land, as well
as the law of our land.

Legal historians Pollack and Maitland

wrote, "From the moment of our historical records in the
very beginning we seem to see a strong desire for unanimity."
That certainly is true.

In the original draft of the 6th

Amendment the House of Representatives put in language that
would make unanimity a "requisite."

That language was

stricken by the Senate, because the Senate believed that a
jury had to be unanimous, was in fact what the definition of
a jury was.

So, the absence of language in the 6th Amendment
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requiring unanimity stems from the Senate's belief that
unanimity and jury are synonymous terms.
I've said that the historical arguments for the most
part are not conclusive, and I, therefore, will not go
through them.

All of them relate to procedures that are not

part of our legal system today.

What is relevant, however,

is the Supreme Court's determination of the constitutionality
of the unanimity rule, a determination based not only on historical analysis, according to Justice White, but rather on
a functional analysis of what the jury is.

And I would like

to focus on the functional analysis, which Justice

\~ite,

I

think, in surprisingly stark language, language which has
been repeated in several Supreme Court cases, said the right
of a jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order
to prevent oppression by government.

He said further, the

framers of the Constitution strove to create an independent
judiciary, but insisted upon further protection against arbitrary action.

Providing the accused with the right to be

tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and
against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.

I will

add more to that when we talk about the political considerations of juries.

But, it's clear that the Supreme Court

believes that the issue of unanimity as a constitutional
matter is geared toward the function of the jury, and that
the function of the jury is to interpose a community body
between the defendant and the prosecutorial powers of the
state.

In that regard, when we turn to the cases themselves
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they seem surprisingly to ignore that constitutional test.
Let me, for your benefit, run through very quickly the
history of Supreme Court
are only a few.

In 1968

cisions

this matter.

There

U. S. Supreme Court decided

Duncan vs. Louisiana, holding that the 14th Amendment guarantees to state criminal defendants a right to trial by jury.
In 1970 that right was extended by a plurality of Baldwin vs.
New York to all non-petty criminal offenses.

A non-petty

offense is defined at least as one that carries a six-month
or more potential sentence.

In 1970 in Williams vs. Florida

the Supreme Court decided that a six-member jury in state
criminal cases is in fact constitutional. Based on language
that it would be the functional equivalent for the purpose
of interposing the community between the state and the prosecutor, the court could see no reason why a six-member jury
would function any differently than a 12-mernber jury.

In

point of fact, as the near unanimous literature on small group
decision-making suggests, the court was
conclusion.

error in that

Nevertheless the issue before us is not the size

of the jury, but rather the unanimity rule.

In 1972 the U. S.

Supreme Court decided Johnson vs. Louisiana and Apodaca vs.
Oregon, upholding state criminal jury trial verdicts of 9 to
3 and 10 to 2.

Once again the court said that a functional

analysis of the jury permits a less than unanimous verdict,
thereby authorizing the states to in fact provide for majority verdicts in criminal cases.

There is no question in

my mind, therefore, that the proposed Amendment is in fact
a valid exercise of constitutional authority by the state.

The question is whether or not it is a wise exercise of
that power, not whether it is a legitimate exercise of
that power.
Let me just as a footnote point out that we know from
two further Supreme Court decisions that a jury of a nonunanimous jury of less than 6, or a unanimous jury of less
than 6 is constitutionally impermissible.

In that regard,

as I think you have already noted in one of your position
papers, the bill as written is potentially unconstitutional,
and will need to have some of the language changed.

Accord-

ing to the California Constitution there is the possibility
in misdemeanor cases for agreement on a less than 12-member
jury.

That would seem in light of the proposed amendment

here to be impossible.

I'm not sure how you would get five-

sixths decisions out of less than a 12-member jury, unless
it's a 6-member jury.

If it's a 6-member jury then it's

clearly in violation of Ballew vs. Georgia, a U. S. Supreme
Court decision, and Birch vs. Louisiana, a U. S. Supreme
Court decision.

And so, as it is presently written, there is

a constitutional infirmity in the bill.

I assume that to be

a minor matter, but nevertheless it does exist.
The question of the wisdom, as opposed to the power, to
decide non-unanimous verdicts it seems to me is why we are
here, and in that regard I follow the wise words of Alexis
de Toqueville that "the jury is both a judicial and a
political institution."

As a judicial institution, in

fact\ the jury plays a statistically small and perhaps even
statistically insignificant role in the criminal justice
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system.

Of all criminal cases in California, as is true

nationwide, 9 out of 10 cases are plea bargained or settled
without jury disposition.

In the 1 out of 10 cases that

is settled, that is not plea bargained, a percentage of
those cases will be decided by non-jury decision-making
defendants will choose not to have a jury trial.

We're talk-

ing approximately of 8% of all of the criminal cases in
California.

Of that 8% the overwhelming number, approximately

90% will be decided by unanimous verdict.

So, in fact we

are talking about one-tenth of one-tenth of the criminal
cases in California.

I will take questions by the way.

Therefore, the actual application of this bill will be 1 out
of every 100 cases in California at best, and probably even
a fewer number than that.

And so the judicial significance

of this bill, and therefore, the question of its cost and
time effectiveness, it seems to me need to be put in perspective.

This bill willnot save very much time, nor will

it save very much money.

It will save time and it will save

money, that's clear, but the amount of time and money I think
will be statistically insign

icant, and in any event it must

be measured against the price which must be paid for the jury
as a political institution.
CHAIRMAN:

Senator Presley.

SENATOR PRESLEY:

You're talking about cost.

How do

you measure the injustice that was just described by Judge
Ideman?
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN:

Yes.

I agree with you, Senator.

It seems to me that what I heard did appear to reflect a
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terrible injustice.
perspective.

But, let's put what we heard in proper

He were told by the good Judge that in this

particular instance a criminal defendant was tried four times.
We were also told that most hung juries result because of
biased, or corrupt, or unthinking, unfeeling jurors.

Now

what we were told, in other words, is that in four separate
juries they would have turned up at least four, but in terms
of his statistics, five, six or seven biased, corrupt jurors.
That strains my credulity.

I'm sorry.

I don't believe it.

In fact, it seems to me that hung juries are not essentially
the product of biased jurors, or corrupt jurors.

There is

no question that instances of that do occur, and this may
very well be one of them, although we have to say it happened
four times seriatim.

If we were to take this particular case

as a standard then we would have hung juries so much more
frequently than we do now.

I just find it hard to believe

that four separate juries would hang up in the same case four
separate times because four biased individuals would be found
in a fact pattern that seems so elaringly oriented towards
a conviction.

There must be some other explanation.

I sug-

gest to you the explanation is that prosecutorial inartfulness
or incompetence is one of the major sources of hung juries,
where the jury in fact wants to convict, but the prosecutor
has failed to meet the burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, and a conscientious juror will respond to that by saying, "I may in my heart of hearts believe this defendant is
guilty, but I've taken a solemn oath to not convict except
on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the prosecutor has
failed to deliver that proof."
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SENATOR PRESLEY:

Well, I guess the only response to that

would be, as testified here, to get more competent deputy
district attorneys in the Distr
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN:

t Attorney's office.

And that may very well be.

may have been an insufficiency of evidence.

There

I can't address

it baffles and saddens me, I think in the same way that it
does you.

But, I can't say that the explanation is that

half a dozen corrupt individuals wouriu up sitting on four
different juries in the same case.

The statistical likeli-

hood of that happening is very, very remote.

I would rather

say there is some other explanation, which we may not be
aware of.
SENATOR PRESLEY:

The only other thought I would have

as long as I have you interrupted -- would be a comment.
It seems to me we certainly have to have the ability to
adapt to change, and this is a vastly different world than
it was 600 years ago.

We are now certainly in a modern age,

the electronic age, the nuclear age, as we saw a couple of
nights ago.

To hang on to the fact that historically this

was the way it has been for 600 years, I would rather look
at it that we are in a different time, circumstances are
different and we should have constitutional provisions
adapt.
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN:
Senator.

I agree with you wholeheartedly,

That's why I thought the arguments -- the histori-

cal arguments were inconclusive and in fact irrelevant.
don't think it would be appropriate to draw from the longevity of the unanimity, the functional necessity of una-
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I

nimity, and that the fact that we've had something for 600
years does not necessarily speak well of it.
SENATOR PRESLEY:

I guess I misunderstood you.

I

thought you were hanging on the historical aspects .....
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN:
SENATOR PRESLEY:
stitutionality of it.

On the contrary, I agree with you .....

There is no question about the conThat has already been decided.

PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN:

Yes, I think that the historical

reasons are best left to history, for the unanimity rule.
SENATOR PRESLEY:

If you are not opposed historically,

and you are not opposed constitutionally, let me be specific:

Why are you opposed?
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN:

I'm opposed politically.

To ad-

dress the question I think that was asked of a former speaker
by Senator Davis, whether or not the increase in efficiency
would also signal a decrease in justice, I believe that it
would.

I believe that we would get a worse quality of

justice and find more severe horror stories, if in fact we
pass this amendment.

I have no question that the histori-

cal reasons and the constitutional reasons are sufficient
to say that there is the power.
SENATOR PRESLEY:

So, you are not concerned about the

fact that we could have deterioration of justice?
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN:

No.

I'm concerned about the fact

that we will have a deterioration of justice.

It seems to

me that that is both inevitable and commonsensical.
explain why.

Let me

I think my response on this matter will be un-

usual.
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SENATOR PRESLEY:

It's all in the eyes

the beholder.

You are talking about justice as it pertains to the defendant,
and not to the victim.
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN:
victim in that sense.

No.

I'm also thinking about the

If you in fact want to do justice to

the victim in a pure sense you would abolish the jury system
entirely.

That, by the way, has already been proposed in

one of the local law journals.

An article by Professor

Kessler in Volume V of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
about a decade ago, suggests the total abolition of the jury
and that as a stopgap measure, we reduce jury size and also
reduce the unanimity rule by requiring majority verdicts.
But, we do that only on the way to a total abolition of the
jury.

It seems to me that my notion of justice is not just

to the victim, but to the victim as a member of the larger
society which tries to do justice, and that at some particular point an individual victim may wind up not receiving justice, but the procedures to deliver justice will have
been maintained.

In short, what I'm saying is that I think

the unanimity rule serves a very important purpose for
justice considerations, in that it protects all of us from
majority rule.

Let me express myself on that point, because

I think that what I have to say will be surprising to you.
I favor the unanimity rule precisely because of what you
might consider its anti-democratic functioning.

The jury

system is in fact the only point in our entire system of
government where a minority .....
CHAIRMAN:

I'm sorry.

PROFESSOR SHCEFLIN:

You favor the unanimity rule?
Yes, precisely because of what you
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might consider its anti-democratic characteristics.

In the

legislative forum the majority rules; a minority has no
ability to protect itself through the exerise of the franchise.

In the executive system that's true as well.

In

the judicial system that is similarly true, because judges
are for the most part either elected by popular vote, majority will, or selected by individuals who have been already voted by majority will.

It is only in the jury that

a minority can speak for itself, and therefore, it is only
in the jury that an individual has the ability to function,
as Justice White suggested, as an interposition between the
defendant and the powers of the state.

It is the anti-

democratic nature of the jury in that sense -- I put antidemocratic in quotes -- that protects all of us.

Let me

address that anti-democratic characteristic more closely.
In our constitutional democracy we do not equate majority rule with what is just or what is right.

Instead we

want everyone to have a voice in our government, although
the majority, as we know and expect, will make most decisions.
But, a jury serves to protect a minority from being trampled
on by a majority, and it also serves to protect the majority
from trampling on its own rights.

Let me quote to you from

Chief Justice Story's commentaries on the Constitution.
It's short, but I think quite elegant.

"The great object of

a trial by jury in criminal cases is to guard against the
spirit of oppression and tyrannyon the part of rulers, and
against a spirit of violence and vindictiveness on the part
of the people.

Indeed it is often more important to guard
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against the latter than the former."

I happen to believe that.

Let me refer to the remarks of the first speaker who said that
on the basis of a local poll 72% of the people would support
this amendment.

I don't doubt that.

What we have is the

majority deciding that the majority will rule in the only
part of our government where it doesn't rule.

I'm surprised

the figure is as low as 72% in that regard.
SENATOR ROBERTI:

Passing the state budget is the other

part.
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN:
SENATOR PRESLEY:

Exactly.

Of course, this is far more than a

majority, it's even more than two-thirds, what we are proposing here.
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN:

The 10-2 or 11-1.

Yes, but it's

reasonable to assume that the 10-2 or 11-1 verdict will stifle
the minority members who are on the panel.
an illustration.

Let me give you

Far more evidence than I need to cite here

suggests that prosecutors as a matter of routine use the
power of peremptory challenge to strike minorities from
juries in many major criminal cases.

If the prosecutor can

be permitted to reduce the potential number of minorities
who sit on juries, and then the 10-2 or 11-1 can be used to
stifle the voices of the few who actually do sit on juries,
we have eliminated the ability of minorities to protect
themselves in hearings of a judicial nature, and so, we in
fact do a double disservice to minorities.
the numbers that are significant.

I don't think it's

If we dealt only with

10-2 or 11-1, I would rather deal with the fact that it's
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only one in 100 cases that at the most would be affected by
this rule, and it seems to me that that is not too high a
price to pay for the fact that unanimity suggests to us a
legitimacy to the jury system as well as the legal system
that in times of unrest by minorities we can't afford to
ignore.

Remember that in 1968 the Jury Selection and Ser-

vice Act extended the possibility of serving on juries to
the widest possible number of individuals in the United
States history.

It is precisely after we extended the fran-

chise to serve on juries to as many people as possible that
we decided we would remove their voice on those jury decisions.

I don't think politically that's wise or fair.

I'm satisfied the majority rule will be the rule in legislative, executive and judicial decisions.

I don't see the

impetus to do so in jury decisions, even despite the fact
that a jury will occasionally reach the wrong result -- a
result that

maybe that's what happened

ceeding trials that we heard about earlier.
to pay.
tice.

the four sucThat is a price

There is no such thing as a perfect system of jusPeople will also wind up being acquitted under this

bill, who would ordinarily perhaps have had another disposition.

I think that because it applies to such few cases

statistically, and because the jury is the essence of our
symbol of constitutional democracy, I would rather err on
the side of the kinds of cases I heard this morning, and feel
sad about that, than eliminate from the jury system a represenatative sampling of the cross section of the community.
Yes.
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CHAIRMAN:

I have to cut you off at some point.

have a number of other witnesses.
question been responded to -- not p

We

I don't know-- has your
ps

the manner you

would like, but .....
SENATOR PRESLEY:
not convincingly.

Well, it's been responded to, but

I guess I'm just not convinced.

It just

seems to me that we have a justice system that I suppose is
supposed to serve everyone, and to make it effective, then,
they throw

all kinds of roadblocks in front of it

to

prevent the police, to begin with, in terms of how they
search and how they arrest.

Then, we've got all kinds of

roadblocks to the district attorney as to what evidence he
can present or what he can't present; and then you get the
jury and you throw some more roadblocks in.

And so it just

seems to me that we have the justice system that's serving
the defendant very well, but not serving the victim so well.
That's just a matter of opinion, I guess, there's no answer
one way or the other.
CHAIRMAN:

Senator Roberti is next and then Senator

Davis.
SENATOR ROBERTI:
tecting themselves.

I want to speak about minorities proI take it that you mean that a jury be-

ing a cross section of the community has to have a representation of people who have similar like experiences, hopefully, and therefore people on the jury who would be minority
with any kind of nature.

You have a better chance of having

a shared life experience with the kinds of situations the
defendant may find himself in that the majority may not have.
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Is that what you mean, or do you mean some kind of rough
numbers with minorities and non-minorities being convicted?
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN:

Well, I think by minority I mean

anybody who happens to be in a minority in that particular
case.

It could be racial; it could be sex based; it could

be religious; it could be political; it could be social.

I

think what I'm saying is that we know from a vast amount of
research on small group deliberations, that a jury that does
not have to reach unanimity will not listen to all of its
members; that in fact that once an initial vote is taken and
that vote is in fact 10 to 2 or 11 to 1, the likelihood of
continuing deliberations, or deliberations with an open mind
decreases dramatically.

And so, what I'm saying is that the

majority will not listen to the minority however the minority
is constituted in that particular case; that the amendment
will have the effect of exercising majority rule, which in
most cases perhaps might be permissible, but in the cases
that are the most important -- the high visibility cases;
the cases where the defendant really does have an argument
of being the wrong defendant, or of being a victim of political persecution, we will eliminate the opportunity for a
minority juror to stand on that ground.

We know that most

jurors will favor the prosecution; they will believe correctly I think, that where there's smoke there's fire, and
that as a general rule prosecutorial staffs don't bring people to trial unless they are in fact guilty.

We, of course,

convict 97% or so, or 96% of the people against whom criminal charges are brought, and so I think the DA system in
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that regard is working fine.

I don't see the imperative to

take the 4% of cases in which defendants feel they have a
legitimate grievance against the complaint filed against
them -- the indictment filed against them -- to take away
their right to be heard, since their position in being a defendant will be a minority position to start with.

Under

this proposal it seems to me we would have certainly sent
John Peter Zanger to the gallows, and definitely William Pitt
as well.

And I would think that for the sake of our consti-

tutional liberty we are better off having jurors reach an
occasional wrong decision by being hung than we are by making
sure that we obtain more convictions, but not necessarily
just convictions.
Let me address very briefly one further point.

\~at

you will do as a result of this amendment, of course, is decrease the quality of prosecutorial performance, because it
will no longer be necessary for the prosecutor to develop
a case to the point of unanimity, and since the overwhelming
number of people who serve as jurors will undoubtedly have
a pro-prosecution bias anyway.

In fact the prosecutors will

not have to convince that minority and will not try to do
so.

You will also encourage the exercise of peremptory

challenges to in fact get a first vote 10 to 2 or 11 to 1
verdict, and there probably will be very little in the way
of deliberations in the jury room.

It seems to me that that

does not contribute to a sense of justice I feel comfortable
with.
CHAIID1AN:

Senator Davis.

-40-

SENATOR DAVIS:
or no, if you can.

I want you to answer this question, yes
Have you specifically studied Louisiana

and Oregon before and after the change to a non-unanimous verdict?
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN:
SENATOR DAVIS:

I have no further questions.

PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN:
to the reason why?
CHAIRMAN:

No, I haven't.

I wonder if I could address myself

Just very briefly.

Can you do so with a couple of sentences?

SENATOR DAVIS:

Another question, yes or no.

Have any

other scholars specifically studied the before and after
percentage of convictions?
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN:
CHAIRMAN:

Yes or no?
I am not aware of any.

Don't leave yet.

Dividing your presenta-

tion into two halves -- your ability to reduce 600 years of
law and history to ten minutes I think was no less than astounding.
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN:
CHAIRMAN:

Thank you.

I think it was a brilliant performance and

I tried to absorb as much as I could because I recognized
that it was coming in a very condensed manner to us.

I

thought it was very useful though, and I give a lot of weight
to your conclusions.

I have some questions about them, but

I am pleased that you are concerned with the history of the
thing, with what the law says and, hopefully, with empirical
data as well as just polls, and your arguments against giving
too much weight to the poll I think is a useful one in this
particular context.

Let me play the devil's advocate for

a minute, and I'm not sure it's not my position, so I shouldn't
call it the devil's advocacy, but why shouldn't society be
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able to protect itself against the statistical oddball, a guy
that will not reason; a guy that is in fact the bigot who
sits on the jury and will not give,

whatever

tion

the elements of reason and opportunity to make themselves
heard in his or her own mind, and stifles the process with
respect to at least that case, and whatever number of cases
in which that statistical oddball appears.

Now I've dis-

tinguished earlier between the 11 to 1 and the 10 to 2 in
that respect; that the 10 to 2 has to be far more remote in
terms of producing the two statistical oddballs on the same
jury.

But why should not society in a 11 to 1 situation be

able to protect itself against that statistical oddball that
I refer to?
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN:

I think that it's not the question

of why it shouldn't protect itself; I think every rational
reasonable society would try to protect itself.

The ques-

tion is what price does it have to pay to do that.

If I

might, for example, use a hypothetical in a related field,
we can take dangerous people off the streets, if we could
predict who would be dangerous.

Now, under the best of

tests -- one that would be 95% effective, we would wind up
taking hundreds and hundreds of people off the streets erroneously.

It seems to me that the price here would be, we can

solve that one case, but at the expense of untold numbers
of cases in which we would be doing injustice.

It seems

reasonable to believe .....
CHAIRMAN:

Well, hidden in all that -- and I think

Senator Presley may be right in this respect -- that hidden in
all of that is the assumption that you look at the defendant
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and talk about the relationship of the minority juror

not

just racial minority or ethnic minority, but minority in
all. ....
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN:
CHAIRMAN:

That's correct.

..... different senses to the defendant and

should not that minority juror be able to assert himself
against the others?

What about the relationship as depicted

in the earlier cases that were described by Judge Ideman
where that individual prevents a minority victim from receiving justice in the sense that the defendant is protected
by that bigoted act on the part of the minority juror
and I mean bigoted also in a broad sense.

It may not be

racial; it may be sexual; it may be professional; it may be
anything.
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN:

Yes.

Well, one of the cases that

is always proposed in this area is let's take us to the Freedom Rider situation down South, and suppose we have a virtually all white jury deciding against white defendants,
whether or not there are crimes having been committed by
them.

If one or two minority members were able to sit on

that jury and escape the peremptory challenge, of course,
those defendants would be acquitted rather than experience
a hung jury.

It seems to me that the argument for fairness

in justice cuts both ways.

There is no way we can guarantee

that these cases will be decided the way we want.

I don't

see the value of obtaining convictions perhaps as strongly
as some of you may.

I think 95% to 97% of convictions is a

high enough figure, and that the one or two or three or four
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cases that we may have to retry to get a conviction, or may
not be able to obtain a conviction, is a relatively small
price to pay.

But, if you take away a

CHAim1AN:

ity .....

But, isn't the deterrent effect of convic-

tions, doesn't that have to do with public perception, and
if you asked the public today how many -- if you asked the
criminal element today how many people get convicted in
criminal cases, and how many get off, and they'll say, "Hell,
with a good lawyer I can get off," and large numbers of defendants are going free or criminals are going free with a
slap on the wrist, and that whole conception that you can
get out of it somehow.
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN:

That's right.

Well, certainly I

agree with you that there are various loopholes in the procedural presentation of cases and in the unconscionable delay in the requirement of a speedy trial, accounts for a
great deal of error.

But, I don't think you can say that

hung juries fit into that category.

They are in numbers of

cases statistically insignificant, and in those numbers it's
not accurate to say that juries were hung by biased or corrupt
individuals.

While that's true in some of the cases, it's

certainly not true in all of them; and perhaps not even true
in most of them.

Part of the difficulty in studying this,

is that if in fact we did determine that the conviction rate
would go up, as it inevitably must -- in jurisdictions like
Louisiana and Oregon -- that wouldn't tell us that they are
delivering a better system of justice; that would just t2ll us
that more people are being convicted.
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It may be that more people are

being convicted unfairly.

We don't know that.

Further,

the problem of studying actual juries I'm sure is familiar
to you.

Most of our research comes from small group de-

liberations and from mock juries.

There are parameters as

to how closely actual real life juries can be studied.

And

so our data is by necessity drawn from a related field and
not the actual experience of jury service.

If in fact the

conviction rate, as I said, goes up, it seems to me that is
not necessarily indicative of a better brand of justice.
CHAIRMAN:
the members.

Let me ask if there is anything further by
Thank you very much.

a great deal to the hearing.
Delman.

You have certainly added

Steve White?

Professor Gerald

Is that correct?

PROFESSOR DELMAN:

Yes.

My name is Gerald Delman and

I am a Professor of Law at Loyola Law School, and I am delighted to be here.

I'm speaking on behalf of California

Attorneys for Criminal Justice, an organization of approximately 1700 criminal defense lawyers.

What I would like to

do is present a brief historical overview that touches some
of the areas of the history of the jury that Professor
Scheflin did not talk about, and then present to you what I
believe are 12 good reasons why we should preserve the unanimous jury in California.
Going back to the misty fields of Runnymede in 1215 -at that time the jury was not actually a fact finder.

The

jury was actually a group of neighbors and witnesses and the
trial was simply a contest between the victim and the defendant to see who could come up with 12 congregators who would
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swear to his or her innocence.

After the jury's role was

transformed into that of a fact-finder, in approximately
the 14th century, unanimity was va

d s

highly that a

jury was required to continue deliberating -- i. e. it could
not be discharged until they reached a unanimous verdict.
And to speed that process along the jury was kept "without
food, drink, fire or candle until their verdict was reached."
So, there literally was no such thing as a hung jury at early
common law, only a hungry jury.
These coercive tactics were abandoned in the 18th century and we started feeding juries and quenching their thirst,
and only at that time did the problem of the jury deadlock
actually arise.

One of my favorite early California cases

involved a defendant who sought a new trial on the ground
that the jury deliberating his fate on a charge of murder
had consumed 20 gallons of beer, 2 demijohns of wine, 2 bottles
of whiskey, as well as other wine and whiskey at each meal,
including breakfast.

The court did grant a new trial in that

case.
But quenching the thirst of juries created the deadlock,
and the deadlock presented a real consitutional dilemma to
the courts a century ago, because the requirement of unanimity
conflicted directly with the protection against double jeopardy that a person could not be tried twice for the same
crime, and the courts opted in favor of preserving the requirement of unanimity and interpreting the double jeopardy
provision to allow a retrial
a unanimous verdict.

the jury was unable to reach

I think that raises a legitimate ques-

tion, whether a valid historical argument could be made that
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abandoning the requirement of unanimity requires the reinstatement of the original protection against double jeopardy, to preclude the retrial altogether of a defendant
if a jury is unable to reach a verdict.
England abandoned the requirement of unanimity in 1967
and they do allow 10-2 verdicts in England.

But, the cri-

minal. ....
CHAIRMAN:

Excuse me for interrupting, but you are

raising that as a policy question or as a legal question?
PROFESSOR DELMAN:
spective.

Just to give you a historical per-

In terms of what England did?

CHAIRMAN:

No.

In terms of whether there is a resur-

rection of the prohibition against double jeopardy .....
PROFESSOR DELMAN:
CHAIRMAN:

Double jeopardy protection.

..... by the abandonment of the unanimity rule .....

PROFESSOR DELMAN:

I'm raising that as a possible con-

stitutional problem that this legislation could raise.

I

think there are several others which I will touch on.
Under the English Criminal Justice Act of 1967, however,
the jury is required to deliberate for a minimal period of
time before they can return a non-unanimous verdict.

The

minimum is two hours and the judge can set a longer period
in a complex case that he believes requires more deliberations.

The commitment to unanimity, however, remains very

strong in the United States.
doned it in felony cases.
Louisiana.

Only two states have aban-

The first state to do so was

Louisiana amended its State Constitution in 1898

to permit 9-3 verdicts in all but capital felonies.
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Inter-

estingly in 1898 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that any
retroactive application of th

change would violate the ex

post facto clause of the Fe

1 Constitution, and that is a

problem you may want to address with respect to this legislation, whether it could have any retroactive application.

I

believe it could not without serious constitutional problems
under the ex post facto clause.
CHAIRMAN:

Senator Presley.

SENATOR PRESLEY:

You say in Louisiana they did that in 1898?

PROFESSOR DELMAN:
SENATOR PRESLEY:

1898.
Since then they've had 9 to 3 juries?

PROFESSOR DELMAN:

No.

While they amended the Constitution

in 1974 to now require 10 rather than 9, but they have had this
proposal in effect .....
SENATOR PRESLEY:
tion.

Let me follow up on Senator Davis' ques-

Do you know anybody that's studied that?

It's been in

effect all those years, we ought to know whether or not they're
turning out a lot of injustice.
PROFESSOR DELMAN:

There have been studies of what effect

this has on the jury deliberation process, especially in Oregon,
and I will touch on that in my testimony.
SENATOR PRESLEY:

As far as you know, there have been no

studies done?
PROFESSOR DELMAN:

I'm not aware of any specific Louisiana

study that addresses it.
SENATOR PRESLEY:

Someone must have done a Ph.D. disserta-

tion on that.
CHAIRMAN: You couldn't very well do a before and after
study, since it happened so long ago.
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SENATOR PRESLEY:
CHAIRMAN:

Well, you could do a comparison study.

Comparison with another state perhaps.

PROFESSOR DELMAN:
recent.

The change in Oregon was much more

Oregon adopted the 10-2 jury verdict in 1934, and ap-

parently that change was inspired by a recommendation made
by the American Law Institute in 1931.

But, significantly,

both of these states took this position long before the U. S.
Supreme Court had even held that the constitutional right to
jury trial under the Federal Constitution applied to the
states, and when the Supreme Court took that step in 1972, as
Professor Scheflin indicated in the Johnson and Apodacca decisions, it opened the door to other states to take the

sa~e

step, and I think it's significant that in the intervening
11 years no other states have taken that step.

Louisiana

and Oregon remain at this point the only two states which
allow non-unanimous verdicts in felony cases.
Now I would like to briefly run through what I think
are 12 good reasons to preserve the requirement of unanimity.
Some of them have already been touched on by Professor
Scheflin.
Reason number one.

The requirement of unanimity fur-

thers the essential requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt in criminal cases.

I think it's significant that as

you go back through 600 years of history of the jury the
unanimity requirement has always been linked to the requirement in criminal cases that we prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

In fact the leading historian of the English

common law, Sir James Fitzjames Stevens, after his historical
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study of the criminal law of England, found that link so
strong that he concluded, 'In my opinion, trial by jury has
both merits and defects, but the unanimity of jurors is
essential to it.

If that is to be given up the institution

itself should be abolished."

In other words, he regarded

unanimity as such an essential part of the jury deliberative
process that if we are going to give that up we might as
well throw the whole thing out.
CHAIRMAN:

Did he ever say why?

PROFESSOR DELMAN:
doubt.

Because of protecting reasonable

His reasoning was we need the protection of reason-

able doubt the most in the closest cases, and in the closest
cases we are going to have the greatest likelihood that one
or two jurors are going to have a reasonable doubt, and if
we ignore that and allow a verdict to be returned we are
giving up the degree of certainty that we should have before
we declare someone guilty or innocent of a crime.
CHAIID1AN:

I don't exactly follow that reasoning.

How is

it a close case if it's 11 to 1?
PROFESSOR DELMAN:

Well, you are going to have 11 to 1

verdicts in the closest cases, and in the closest cases is
where this concept of reasonable doubt gives the greatest
proection.
CHAIRMAN:

If you had 5 to 4, or 6 to 3, or 7 to 2,

how is 11 to 1 close?
PROFESSOR DELMAN:

I don't understand that.
It's not close in terms of the

division of the jury, but it's in that kind of case where
the evidence is close that allowing that one juror's
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reasonable doubt to preclude a verdict gives the greatest
protection.
CHAIRMAN:

OK.

My numbers are wrong.

with 9-member juries in my mind.

I was dealing

But, I don't see how

that is considered to be a close case if it's 11 to 1.

I

don't understand that argument.
PROFESSOR DELMAN:

Well, what I'm saying is it's in

the closest cases that we are going to have the possibility
of a hung jury present itself.
CHAIRMAN:

Yes.

PROFESSOR DELMAN:

And when that possibility presents

itself, preserving the value of one juror's doubt of being
enough to abort the proceedings gives us a greater protection
to that concept of reasonable doubt, and I think that was
Stevens' point.
The second reason I would advance is one that hasn't
really been talked about, and that is the value of the deliberative process itself.

I think perhaps the most dra-

matic illustration I could offer is a fictional one.

It's

the presentation in motion pictures and in a Broadway play
called "Twelve Angry Men" where the jury retires and their
first vote is 11 to 1 for conviction, and their final vote
is 12 to 0 for acquital.

Now that kind of turnaround doesn't

happen very frequently in actual cases.

In fact the studies

that have been done of jury behavior suggests that in only
one out of ten cases does the minority actually turn around
and convince the majority.

But that process is worth pre-

serving, because if we permit the jury to return a verdict
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as soon as they have 10 votes or 11 votes, that minority view
may never be listened to.

The doubts of a Henry Fonda who is

hanging up the jury may never be thrashed out in the jury
room.
And that leads me to reason number three, and that is
that the experience in the states which allow non-unanimous
verdicts confirms that jury deliberation is cut short.

Now

here I'm referring to a survey of all felony jury verdicts
in Multnomah County,Oregon for a three-year period ending
in 1983, and that survey revealed that a majority of all
verdicts returned by juries in t1ultnomah County were not unanimous.

30% were 10 to 2; 26% were 11 to l; and only 44%

of their verdicts were unanimous.

Now compare that to our

experience and the experience in other states requiring unanimity, where only approximately 2-1/2% of the juries hang
up by a 10 to 2 or 11 to 1 vote.

I think that makes it clear

an abolition of the unanimity requirement removes any motivation that the jurors may have to continue deliberations
after they achieve the 10 or 11 votes required for conviction
or acquital.
My fourth reason is that the requirement of unanimity
ensures full participation of minorities in the jury process.

Professor Scheflin touched on this.

I think it's

especially important in California where we value so highly
the ethnic and cultural diversity of juries that we constitutionally preclude the use of any group bias to strike a
juror during the peremptory challenges to the jury.
My fifth reason is that the unanimous verdict is greater
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public assurance that final justice has been done.

I think

the finality of a jury verdict conveys a symbolic message to
the community at large.

It says to the community that all

reasonable doubts have been resolved, or in the case of a
verdict of not guilty, that all of the jurors concluded that
the prosecution had not overcome the burden of proving of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.

And that precludes second guess-

ing, and it unites the jury in a public declaration of their
decision.

They come in, they are polled, they say, "We all

agree with this verdict," and that says something to the
community.

Since in California a juror is permitted to im-

peach his own verdict, it can be anticipated that abandoning
this unanimity requirement will increase such challenges,
using the affidavits of dissenting jurors.

Such challenges

have become commonplace in civil cases in California, and
I think under this proposal they will become commonplace
in criminal cases.
My sixth reason is that the vast majority of states
adhere to the requirement of unanimity.
on that.

I've already touched

It's clear that after 11 years Louisiana and Oregon

continue to stand alone.

The vast majority of the 50 states

plus the federal system still adhere to the requirement of
unanimity.
CHAIRMAN:

The federal system is required too, constitutionally!

PROFESSOR DELMAN:

Yes.

It is required -- constitu-

tionally required.
My seventh reason is, I think, kind of the counterpoint to
what Judge Ideman had to say this morning.
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Judge Ideman's

example, I think we should bear in mind, ultimately resulted
in the conviction of the culprit.
edged sword.

But unanimity is a two-

Not only does it protect

defendant against

conviction until 12 jurors are convinced of his guilt, it
also protects the community against acquital unless 12 jurors
agree that there is a reasonable doubt as to his gpilt, and
there is at least one convicted murderer who is now in state
prison who would be walking the streets of Los Angeles right
now if this proposal were in effect.
On August 24, 1980 four citizens were gunned down near
the intersection of Pico and Robertson in Los Angeles.

Three

of the victims were elderly residents out for an evening
stroll, and one was a young French tourist visiting Los
Angeles.

At the first trial of the two defendants accused

of these four murders, the jury hung 11 to 1 for the acquital
of Perry Jackson.

One juror had no reasonable doubt of his

guilt, and that juror's conscience was vindicated in aretrial at which Jackson was convicted of those four murders.
He is now serving a term of 96 years to life in the state
prison, and if this proposal had been in effect at the time
that trial took place, he would be walking the streets.
CHAIRMAN:

Senator Presley.

SENATOR PRESLEY:

That is not totally correct, is it?

Couldn't the district attorney try him again?
PROFESSOR DELMAN:
effect.
him.

No.

Not if this proposal were in

The ll to 1 verdict for acquital would have freed

The DA was, of course, free to try him again; did and

got a conviction under the present requirement of unanimity
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CHAIRMAN:

Isn't that one of the baffling but sad sit-

uations that Professor Scheflin referred to.

I mean, how

does one explain an 11 to 1 in favor of acquittal, followed
by a 12-0 in favor of guilty?
PROFESSOR DELMAN:

Well, the evidence may be more con-

vincing at the second trial.
CHAIRMAN:

But the probability of that occurring is

ever so slight, I guess.
PROFESSOR DELMAN:

All I'm saying is the probabilities

cut both ways.
CHAIRMAN:

It cuts both ways.

SENATOR PRESLEY:

We're talking about the probabili-

ties cutting both ways.
of a case like that.
heard.

That's the first time I ever heard

That's the first example I've ever

Do you know of any others?

PROFESSOR DELHAN:
SENATOR PRESLEY:

I'm sure I can come up with some.
That's the first time I've ever heard

of it cutting that way.
PROFESSOR DELMAN:

I myself as a prosecutor, prosecuted

a man for a counterfeiting conspiracy and got a 10-2 for
acquittal the first trial and a conviction at the second
trial.

It does happen.

CHAIRMAN:

I guess it's as improbable as the other case

where you had four acquittals based on the alleged prejudice
against the victim.

That sounded very improbably to me. 1

guess it's hard to tell.
PROFESSOR DELMAN:

All right.

Reason number 8 that I

would offer to preserve unanimity, is that allowing 10-2
verdicts would eliminate only a small portion of jury dead-
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locks.

You're going to hear later today from Professor

Flynn, who conducted a study of all felony jury trials in
the ten most populous counties of California for a threeyear period, and that study revealed that, while about 12%
of all jury trials ended in a deadlock, in the vast majority
of these cases the final split between the jurors was by a
margin greater than 11 to 1 or 10-2.

Over 60% of the hung

juries involved a final vote of 6-6, 7-5, 8-4 or 9-3.

So,

these deadlocks, of course, would continue, even if this proposal were in effect.
Reason number nine.

I also draw from Professor Flynn's

study because it showed even as to the deadlocked jury trials
very few of them necessitated a retrial.
of those cases were actually retried.

Only one-fourth

40% of the cases were

subsequently dismissed; 34% were resolved by guilty pleas;
and in the one-fourth that were retried, 18% resulted in
conviction, and 8% in acquital.

I think that suggests that

we are paying a very small price for the requirement of unanimity.
Reasons numbers ten and eleven related specifically to
what I see as drafting defects in the language of this proposal, because this proposal simply provides that except in
capital cases the jury's verdict must be by five-sixths of
the jurors.

Now while the provision maintaining the re-

quirement of unanimity for capital cases reflects, I believe,
a plausible concern for greater certainty ,before we take
someone's life, unfortunately the corrolary of this provision is that one who faces execution must bear a heavier
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burden to gain acquittal, because in a capital case he must
get a unanimous acquittal.

In order to justify that kind

of classification, I think the state is going to have to
show a compelling interest, and even if a simple rational
basis test were applied, there doesn't appear to be any
reason why the defendant should face a heavier burden to
gain his acquittal simply because his conviction might end
his life.
SENATOR PRESLEY:

I'm losing something here.

If some-

body faced a burden of gaining his acquittal, if he is acquitted, probably 11
his conviction.

peopl~

very

~ikely,

or 10 voted for

So his acquittal would be about one, two or

three .....
PROFESSOR DELMAN:

The problem is, Senator, you are say-

ing to a capital defendant, "You cannot be acquitted unless
all 12 jurors agree that there is a reasonable doubt of your
guilt."

Whereas if he were not a capital defendant, he would

be acquitted as soon as 10 jurors had a reasonable doubt.
Even if two thought he should be convicted, and you're denying that advantage to a defendant, simply because he is charged
with a capital crime.
CHAIRMAN:

Isn't there a public policy argument that it

is more serious both for the public at large and for the defendant, and therefore you want a unanimous verdict before
conviction, or unanimous acquittal before you free the person?
PROFESSOR DELMAN:

I don't think that that public policy

argument is very weighty.
ed this problem.

In fact in Oregon they have avoid-

If you look at the Oregon constitutional

provision, it simply says that unanimity is required for a
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conviction.

10 out of 12 is OK for any felony case, except

a capital case, and they say for first degree murder conviction you need a unanimous verdict.

But, the Oregon Con-

stitution permits an acquittal of first degree murder based
on 10 out of 12 jurors.

So, they've avoided this problem,

and I think it is a significant constitutional problem in
terms of equal protection.
The other problem I see, and this is reason number 11,
relates to the problem of lesser included offenses.

Typi-

cally in a murder case the jury will be instructed that if
they find an essential element of first degree murder is not
present, they can then go on to find the defendant guilty of
second degree murder or manslaughter, which are lesser included offenses, if they find all the elements of those offenses.

But, under this bill you are saying no verdict can

be returned except a unanimous one in a capital case.

That

presents the possibility that the jury could unanimously
agree that there is not a first degree murder; 10 out of 12
of the jurors could agree that there is manslaughter, or
second degree murder, and they couldn't return a verdict.
SENATOR PRESLEY:
Professor.

Well, I understand what we're doing,

We are not touching the capital cases at all.

We are just leaving them alone.
PROFESSOR DELMAN:

Oh, no.

No.

You are not, because

you are saying, in the language of this bill, in a criminal
action other than for an offense punishable by death, fivesixths of the jury may render a verdict.
SENATOR PRESLEY:

That's what I said, we are setting it

aside.
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PROFESSOR DELMAN:

But, what you are doing is creating

an anomaly, because in a non-capital case

let's say the

defendant were charged initially with second degree murder
or manslaughter -- clearly all we would need would be a 10-2
verdict, but simply because the case starts out with a prosecutorial charge of a capital offense, you change the whole
equation and you say no verdict can be returned unless it's
unanimous.

I think that creates a significant .....

SENATOR PRESLEY:
PROFESSOR DELMAN:

If that is the problem, is it fixable?
It's fixable in this bill.

Unfor-

tunately it's not fixable in the criminal justice-- the
Criminal Court Procedure Initiative, because that's beyond
correcting at this point.
SENATOR ROBERTI:
PROFESSOR DELMAN:

It's cast in stone.

Run this one by me again.
OK.

What this bill says is, "Other

than for an offense punishable by death five-sixth of the
jury may render a verdict."

All right.

We start with a

first degree murder charge that is punishable by death.
The jury agrees -- it is not first degree murder.

10 out

of 12 of them agree, let's say that it's second degree murder.

They can't return a verdict because in this criminal

action we're dealing with an offense punishable by death.
The problem was avoided, incidentally, by the Oregon provision,
by simply saying that for a first degree murder verdict you
need a unanimous jury.
Hy final point, and I will close on this note, and
reason number 12 I think is that the abolition of the requirement of the unanimity will create a precedent for further
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dilution of the right to jury tr

1.

The tradition of una-

nimity runs unbroken through 13!+ years of California history,
and centuries of English and American pract

e, and I fear

that once that tradition is broken we can anticipate further efforts to dilute the protection of the right to jury
trial.
jury?

Why not 9-3 verdicts; why not reduce the size of the
In the colorful words of Justice L. Thaxton Hanson

"The camel's nose is in the tent," and he warns us that the
red light is flashing against any further tampering with
California's jury system.

"In my vievJ," he states, "any effort

to reform California's criminal justice process by further
tampering with the 12-member jury would be extremely unwise
"
.
an d counterpro duct~ve.

I very seldom find an opportunity

to agree with Justice L. Thaxton Hanson, but on this point
I concur.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN:

Any questions of the witness?

much for your testimony.
MR. STEINER:

Thank you very

John Steiner.

Good morning.

It's a pleasure to be here

and I'm delighted to testify before the subcommittee.

Most

of the points which I had been intending to make have already been made by the two Professors who testified before
me.

But, let me run down one or two which I think are par-

ticularly important.
The idea of a 10-2 jury verdict would, I think, substantially draw into question the defendant's right to a
cross section of the community on the jury panel.

What often

happens, for example, if there is a black defendant and one
black, two blacks on the jury, the peremptory challenges
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will be used to remove from the jury those people who are
also black, and I think it could go to any minority, and I
think it drastically changes the defendant's opportunity to
get a fair cross section of the community on his panel.
There is a long history -- everyone has talked about it
the unanimous jury panel is a basic, essential part of American jurisprudence which I don't think should be ignored.

This

bill is clearly intended to ease the prosecutor's burden of
proof, and it will do that.

It could, and undoubtedly will,

lead to convictions -- more convictions on less evidence than
is the case right now, and I think that's the intent of it.
I think that's something that needs to be looked at very carefully, because I think you stand a much greater chance of convicting innocent people when you allow a non-unanimous verdict
of this type.
I was going to use the Twelve Angry Men analogy, because
I think that's particularly appropriate.

Senator Keene, to

respond to one of the questions that you posed earlier, do
you assume automatically that if there's an 11 to 1 division
that the one person is automatically the oddball?

It seems

to me that there is a substantial possibility that that one
person may have in fact seen something others didn't see; or
those two people may have seen something that others didn't
see.

So, unless you define that person as an oddball to be-

gin with, it seems to me then we have to give their views
some credence.
CHAI~AN:

Just to clarify my position, it is not that

the one person who is the holdout is in every case an odd-
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ball, hut

IT1 ;J

or

ccrt:lin pcrcent:lgC'

tlwse C::ISC'S --

I don't know

how many -- you're going to have an individual who is totally obstinate or potentially corrupt. /\nd those are the
cases that people who are on the other side of the issue purport to be concerned about and the cost of reprosecuting
those cases in such situations.

It is possible that all of

the reason that is available to that jury, the resource of
reason, is vested in a single individual in an 11 to 1 situation.

But, it is to me unlikely

very statistically im-

probable -- that if all the reason is vested in that individudl
and not in the other jurors, that that individual will have
been unable to persuade any of his or her colleagues as to
the innocence or guilt of the individual involved, and you
know there is always that other case, and there is always
that sliver of possibility that a particular case will be
the case in which that probability will arise.

But, I think

it's very slight -- ever so slight.
MR. STEINER:

I understand the point that you are mak-

ing and I don't disagree with you at all.

But, it seems to

me that one of the basic tenets of the American system of
justice has been that better ten guilty people go free than
one innocent person be convicted, and I don't think I'm leaning too heavily on the rights of the defendants.

This is

part of the framework of our legal system; it's part of what
this society is made of, and

seems to me that the very

fact that there are likely to be, or that there may be some
people in a situation who don't agree makes it very important to protect the right in this situation.
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The one other point that I would make, and I think it
fits right along with this -- it's been mentioned briefly
before, but the idea of unanimity, requiring unanimity of
the group it seems to me can have only the effect of improving the quality of deliberation.

If you go back into

the jury room and there are 9 people who are for either conviction or acquittal, then they know all they need to get is
one more and they can look hard or lean on particularly one
individual.

But, the whole quality of the deliberations,

the reasoning process, it seems to me would be -- is vastly
improved when the jury is aware that they must come out with
a unanimous verdict.

And I would say also that the concept

of jury unanimity does go to support the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard which is another basic part of our jurisprudence.
I haven't heard the position of the Attorney General
this morning, but I think it's very significant that the
Attorney General's office in this situation is taking a position opposing this bill.

This is a prosecutorial agency run

by a man who used to be the District Attorney of Los Angeles
County, and I think it's rare on a bill like this that we
get the kind of mixed support, or mixed opposition, if you
will, in this particular situation.
As a final comment I would just add to the questions
that have been asked before regarding the studies, or have
studies been done of other jurisdictions which have had this
problem. The fact is there are only two in the entire nation
that allow 10-2 convictions on felonies, and the fact is
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apparently

at least in Californ

no real work has been

done on it to study what has gone on

other communities.

To make such a radical change in our criminal procedure without a very, very detailed sophisticated study of what effects
this approach has had in other jurisdictions is a very, very
dangerous, I think, and radical change with our jury procedure.
CHAIRl~N:

OK.

MR. STEINER:
CHAI~N:

Any questions of Mr. Steiner?
Thank you.

Thank you very much for being with us.

Frank Bardsley.
MR. BARDSLEY:

Good morning.

I am here as a represen-

tative of the California Public Defenders Association, but
in that capacity, as Judge Ideman did, I think it would behoove me to give you my background.

Since 1969 I have been

a practicing Deputy Public Defender in the Los Angeles
office; and in the last two years I have been the Division
Chief of our Central Superior Court Trials Division.

So,

to this particular discussion this morning I bring a certain
history and a certain viewpoint on this issue.

I don't think

it would be surprising that I am absolutely against SCA 10
that we are talking about this morning.

I think Professor

Delman and the other Professors that have testified, and
will testify today, have covered many of the grounds that
anyone could come up with, but I think the bottom line that
this committee and the Legislature must deal with is what
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kind of society do we want to live in as citizens of the
State of California.

I think it is beyond question that as

we reduce the requirement from 12 to 0, to 11 to 1, or 10 to
2, or 9 to 3, that through those cracks will fall innocent
people who will be convicted.

I think the very fact that in

capital cases that it's required that we maintain unanimity
is, if not an agreement, at least a concession that that is
the case, because in capital cases obviously it's too serious to take that chance.
Coupled with the fact that the cost that we are dealing
with here, the proponents I think suggest that we are going
to save money and that's the reason that we should do this,
the cost savings and the time savings, I think, balanced
against where we are going to be as a society is simply not
worth it.
The District Attorney this morning led off with some
statistics .....
SENATOR PRESLEY:

Where we are as a society at the mom-

ent, we have a lot of dissatisfaction.

To a certain extent

the courts and the criminal justice system has been discredited.
I think we need to improve on that.

And one reason I think

it has been discredited is that the system seems to be so
weighted in favor of the defendant and against the victim.
That's why people are sick and tired of it after a while.
It's been going on so many years and they, as indicated in
that poll, think some changes are necessary to fine-tune this
system.
HR. BARDSLEY:

Senator, I think the passage of this

type of legislation would in the long run exacerbate the
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very problem that you are trying to alleviate.

When people

in this state are sent to the state penitentiary for long,
long periods of time; when members of the jury that convicted them are convinced that they are innocent, it is not
going to make the people as a whole feel that the system has
the moral force it should.

I think this is exactly the wrong

way to get at the problem that you are trying to alleviate.
SENATOR PRESLEY:

If you recall, the District Attorney's

testimony this morning, he said most of the people who hold
out don't do it based on the evidence, maybe they do it on
some kind of bias, they're dogmatic, or something totally
aside from the evidence.
MR. BARDSLEY:

Well, I would like to -- I was going to

address the District Attorney's testimony because there was
some misstatement, I think, of provable fact there.

I will

start at the beginning with Mr. Philibosian's testimony.
He said that the Executive Officer of the Los Angeles County
Superior Courts indicated that 15% of all cases that are
tried are hung juries.

It was published yesterday, I might

add, in the Daily Journal the Executive Office of the Superio:r- Courts study for the last five years indicates 9%,
not 15%, are hung juries.

The study that Professor Delman

talked about, that Professor Flynn, I'm sure, will talk to
you about later today, was a three-year study of the 10
largest counties in the State of California that tried 81%
of all the felony jury trials in the state during 1971,
and '73 -- almost 9,000 jury trials -- indicated that

'72
of the

cases that are hung -- now we're talking the 9% that are
hung -- of that 9%, 75% are never retried, only 25% are re-
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tried.

I would submit to you that it's obvious which cases

are retired and which ones aren't.

40% of the hung juries

Those are the cases I submit that are 11 to

are dismissed.

1' 10 to 2 and 9 to 3 for acquittal.

In 35% the defendant

pleads guilty, and those, I would submit to you, are the
The

cases that are 11 to 1, 10 to 2, 9 to 3 for conviction.

25% of the 9%, which comes out to 2% of all the jury trials,
those are the ones I would submit that are hung 7 to 5, 6 to
6 and 8 to 4.

This legislation will not reach those cases.

The impact of this legislation is going to be absolutely minimal in the criminal justice system.

On average last year the

best statistics that we can have in Los Angeles County that
this would result in savings of less than three cases per
month for the entire County of Los Angeles in retrials.

And

would also .....
SENATOR PRESLEY:
on these figures.

There might be a difference of opinion

I just don't believe that the District

Attorney and the Judge that was in here today would be supporting this bill if that was all they get out of the bill,
what you say.
MR. BARDSLEY:

They get something else out of it, Senator.

I think that's something we ought to be very honest about.
Again, the statistics have shown that cases that are hung
11 to 1 or 10 to 2, whether they be for acquittal or for conviction.

So, what I think, in answer to Senator Davis'

question, "Are we getting more convictions through this
legislation?"

The answer is "yes," you will get more con-

victions through this legislation on the first trial.
is apparent.

All the studies have shown that.

That

The question

that I think you have to ask yourselves, "Are you saving
enough money and enough time with that one case out of less
than a thousand that you are go

to save on the retrial to

do away with something that is as important to the American
system of criminal justice as the unanimous verdict?"

I per-

sonally don't think you are, and I think you are going to see
if this particular piece of legislat

gets on the ballot,

I think you are going to see that 72% that Mr. Philibosian
was talking about is nothing like 72% when the electorate
really understands what we're talking about here.
CHAIRMAN:

Isn't that somewhat conclusionary about "as

important to the American system of justice as the unanimous
verdict?"

Aren't you deciding the question when you compare

it in those terms?
MR. BARDSLEY:

I think that's the question that per-

haps you, as Legislators, have to determine.
is that issue?

How important

To me, and to the organization which I re-

present, it's extremely important.
CHAI~~N:

OK.

And the why for that is that otherwise

some innocent people will .....
HR. BARDSLEY:

To me personally that is one of the

single most important things that I can think of.

Our whole

system of justice is based on what Hr. Steiner has just said,
that innocent people not be convicted.

That, in my opinion,

is the real reason for the jury and the unanimous jury system.
It is to make real sure, to the extent that we can, that we do
not convict innocent people.

We are going to convict more

innocent people with 10 to 2 verdicts or 11 to 1 verdicts than
we do with unanimous.

I think that follows absolutely.
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CHAIRMAN:

What about the argument from the other side

that says that the prospect of being able to act criminally
in our society without sanction ever being imposed causes a
certain number of criminals to do what they do and that there
will be a certain number of innocent victims that will fall
prey to those criminals as a consequence of leaving it unanimous.
MR. BARDSLEY:

In the last sentence you got past me.

I would agree totally that criminals should be apprehended
and they should be convicted and they should be punished.
That's as important to me as a defense attorney as it is to
anyone else.

I am a citizen of this society like ewerybody

else.
CHAIRlUlli:

The prospect of eluding that, according to

proponents of this measure -- the prospects of eluding that
induce a certain amount of criminal behavior to which innocent people fall victim.

Aren't you as

concerned about those

innocent victims as you are about the innocent defendant?
MR. BARDSLEY:

I don't think the premise is correct.

If you are saying that because a case is hung 11 to 1 or
10 to 2 for guilty that the criminal goes free, it is simply
not true.

That is not the fact.

The fact is that if the

case is hung 11 to 1 or 10 to 2 for guilty, the overwhelming percentage of the cases the defendant is going to plead
guilty at that point.
to trial.

He's seen what happens if he goes

The other percentage of the cases, certainly the

district attorney isn't going to dismiss, he is going toretry, and these cases that are retried, the statistics again --
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ingly for conviction.
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So, nobody is going free to be again

foisting themselves upon

e public because it's hung up 11

to 1 for guilty.
CHAIRMAN:

But, if that percentage is so small, what is

the prospect of an innocent defendant being convicted under
an 11 to 1 system?
MR. BARDSLEY:

I think we have obviously not that many.

But, I can tell you this.

I would say almost monthly --

either in the Los Angeles Times, San Francisco Chronicle,
Sacramento Bee, you can pick up the newspaper and read of
instances where people have been in prison for long periods
innocently.

It happens all the time, unfortunately.

a price we have to pay in our system, I believe.

That's

However,

you can rest assured you will be reading about that a lot
more on an 11 to 1, and considerably more again for a 10 to 2,
and what I'm saying is you have the power to do it.
worth it?
side.

Is it

I don't think it is for what you get on the other

You get very, very little.
CHAIRMAN:

Senator Presley.

SENATOR PRESLEY:
the time.

11

You use the phrase "It happens all

What do you mean by that?

MR. BARDSLEY:

Senator, by that I mean that .....

SENATOR PRESLEY:
MR. BARDSLEY:

It happens .....

SENATOR PRESLEY:
MR. BARDSLEY:

I think it happens quite rarely.

It doesn't happen all the time.

Senator, this much I can say.

The State

Public Defenders Office puts out a publication that I re-
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ceive every two weeks.

Part of that publication deals with

doesn't deal with, but it has aspects to it which deal with
innocent people that have been convicted and it has since
been found out that they have been released.

I get this

publication twice a month and I would venture to say that at
least half the time there is such an instance shown.

Now,

these are cases where somebody may have been in custody years
upon years upon years.

They have now been found.

saying is that that number will increase.

All I'm

Obviously those

people that go to jail for 90 days, 120 days, or one or two
years the chances of any inequities that have occurred there
being found are very small.
SENATOR PRESLEY:

If we are convicting that many innocent

people and sending them to prison, that it happens all the
time, then I am in doubt that would be a very heavy concern
(inaudible)
MR. BARDSLEY:

It does happen, Senator.

I wish -- there

is obviously no way that we will ever know how often.

All

we can know is those few cases after the fact that are found
out.

The other cases that aren't found out we don't know.

We know it has happened, we know that we have executed people
in the United States that have been proven to be innocent
after the fact.
SENATOR PRESLEY:

Given the limitation on all the screen-

ing that takes place before a person is finally judged guilty,
it just seems like if that happens all the time we sure have
a leaky system.
MR. BARDSLEY:

Senator, let me .....
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SENATOR PRESLEY:

First

all, there are inhibitions

on the police, there are investigation and arrest procedures,
there are inhibitions there.

Then before they can even file

a complaint, the district attorney has to make a screening.
Then before the conviction,
admissibility of evidence.

are restrictions on the
Then you get to the jury, it has

to be unanimous and with all of that weighted in favor of the
defendant, and you say it happens all the time.

You are say-

ing that innocent people are being convicted regularly.
MR. BARDSLEY:

I don't want this committee to place a

percentage on what I meant by that.
percentage is; I simply don't.

I don't know what that

I don't think anybody in the

United States does.
SENATOR PRESLEY.
MR. BARDSLEY:

It's all the time means pretty common.

I think it is happening perhaps, unfor-

tunately it probably is happening -·- it has to, we're human
beings, we're fallible -- it has to happen.
SENATOR PRESLEY:
sumption on your part.
t1R. BARDSLEY:

You have to admit that's just an asYou can't prove .....

I cannot prove what percentage that is.

It's all I can take you back .....
SENATOR PRESLEY:
MR. BARDSLEY:

..... that statement that you're making.

I can take you back in literature.

take you back in history and point to instances of it.

I can
What

I'm saying is those instances are going to increase.
SENATOR PRESLEY:
all the time.

What you are saying today is it happens

You augment it by saying that it is an assumption

on your part.
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MR. BARDSLEY:
pened.

Senator, I can prove that it has hap-

I can prove that.

SENATOR PRESLEY:
MR. BARDSLEY:

Not all the time.

What does all the time mean?

It's a

small percentage -- today it is a small percentage of the
cases -- a very small percentage of the cases.
SENATOR PRESLEY:
MR. BARDSLEY:

What do you mean all the time?

It has happened throughout our history.

It has happened since I have been .....
SENATOR PRESLEY:
CHAIRMAN:

How frequently?

Senator Davis.

SENATOR DAVIS:

Do you think it happens very often with

public defenders doing the defending?
pretty good.

I think you guys are

If I was being charged I would much rather have

a public defender than paid counsel, I think, because I think
you put your heart into it.

You are exceptionally good law-

yers, and you conspire together and get defendants off.

You

analyze the courts and where to go and I find it difficult
to believe that it would happen very often to someone who was
represented by a public defender.

Now, if he just picks up

counsel and is short of money or something, it might happen
more there, but I think in a California Public Defender system that happens a lot less frequently than it would in most
other states.
MR. BARDSLEY:

That may be the case, Senator.

I would

tend to agree with you, and I'm not trying to tell this committee that is something that happens 10% of the cases, or
5% of the cases.

I don't suspect that it's that high, I
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don't know.

All I am saying to this committee is that it

does happen, and I think we all know it, and I think we all
have to agree that if we
to happen more often.

to 11 to 1 or 10 to 2 it is going

To what extent we probab

will never

be able to find out, but it is

ing to happen more often.

That is the point that I'm mak

What we are getting in
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payback from this legislation is so miniscule that I don't
think if it happens one time more it's worth it, but certainly not if it happens to the extent that I think that
it may on a 10 to 2 verdict, or even 11 to 1.
And in answer to something Senator Presley said earlier,
in these instances where a jury has voted 11 to 1 to acquit
and will turn around and vote the next time to convict, Perry
Jackson was the most recent example that comes to mind -those cases happen from time to time too, and I think maybe Senator Davis would be able to second this.

I think oftentimes

when a prosecutor tries the case the second time, his case
is going to get stronger.

He knows where the defense is com-

ing from; he knows what the defense witnesses are going to
say. Any holes in his case, if it's possible to be patched
up, have been patched up.

That's what happened in Perry

Jackson; that's what happened in other cases where that happens.

Unfortunately, we are in a certain fiscal crunch.

I

think every Senator on this committee knows that better than
I do.

One of the unfortunate fallouts from that is that our

prosecutor's offices are staffed probably at a level that is
below what they should be.

When you give a defense attorney

more cases than he should adequately have, you are going to
have the chances of an injustice happening.

When you give

a prosecutor less time to prepare and more cases than he
should have, you are going to have a chance that a case is
going to be ill prepared and ill presented the first time
it happens.

I think you ought to seriously think about what

you're going to do in that respect as well.

-74-

Perry Jackson --

I happen to know that case.

The defense attorney that tried

it is a close friend of mine, and he is one of the public
defenders that I sup

se.

t

man has been found

to be guilty of four counts of first degree murder.
would be on the streets today

He

the same neighborhod where

the jury said he committed those four murders had this legislation been in effect.

That's something I think is very

sobering.
CHAIRMAN:

Let me suggest at this point that in listen-

ing to all of this I am in a great state of doubt that anything is being proved.

The proposal is to increase -- the

proposal would increase the risk to the defendant of conviction.

The proposal presumably would increase the risk

to the state of an acquittal.

The proponents come in and

conclude that this proposal is a bene£

to innocent victims,

that by convicting more people, by moving the process faster,
by reducing costs, you are going to benefit innocent victims.
You come in and you argue that it's a detriment to innocent
defendants.

I haven't seen either side prove its case -- I

haven't heard either side prove its case.

I don't know the

answer to that question.
MR. BARDSLEY:
be here about.

I think

t answer is what you should

I think everybody has sa

that.

Before we

change 600 years and let 48 of the other 50 states do
what we have done since the institut

of this state, we

ought to have more data, more empirical information on which
to base this judgment.
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CHAIRMAN:

You're taking the conservative position, that

we should not make a change until the case is absolutely
proven that we should make the change.
MR. BARDSLEY:
CHAIRMAN:

Absolutely.

On something as .....

Because the system that we have now is so

good, even though it regularly convicts innocent defendants?
MR. BARDSLEY:

I want to get away from regularly con-

victing innocent defendants.
CHAIRMAN:

Occasionally, intermittently .....

HR. BARDSLEY:

OK.

I agree with that.

Now that may

sound to you to be a logic less than compelling. But it's a

truism that we are all human beings and human beings are
the ones that make the system work or not work.

As long as

it is peopled by human beings mistakes are going to be made.
In the United States, I think we have correctly placed a
high value on personal freedom.

Before we change what we

are doing now and lessen the prospects of somebody, or
greaten the prospects,thatsomebody would lose their freedom,
unjustly we ought to have more information than I've seen
presented to this panel.
CHAIRMAN:

I understand that argument, and it works

nicely in a courtroom.

You are a Legislator sitting here,

and you say to yourself neither side on the merits has
proven its case, but the public out there by 72%, or whatever, has the perception that the current system is detrimental to innocent victims and potential victims in our society.
They want us to act.

Now we exercise our judgment on the
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merits, we also respond
able to the electorate.

sumably because we are accountSo, isn't

you came up with an a

0

move in this direction, that

t

likely that unless

y we should not

ll

islators will respond

to the political polls and say, "Well, the public perception
is this, it's a gray area, why shouldn't we go ahead and do
it and act as representatives?"
MR. BARDSLEY:

I have two answers to that.

Number one,

I think, again -- we're really talking philosophy now, as
a Legislator you have to answer this yourselves as individuals, I suppose.

As a Legislator do you impose your own

judgment and knowledge that you get from studying issues,
listening to testimony, observing the system, or are you
simply a conduit for the public will in all instances?

As

I said, each of you I think has to answer that question.
CHAIRMAN:

I think in the judgment issue -- when the

judgment issue is in doubt, isn't the Legislator's responsibility to advance the will of the people?
MR. BARDSLEY:

I think, on the issue that we are talk-

ing about today, to me which is fundamental to our system,
our scheme of criminal justice in this country, something
that is so fundamental, I would think before I would go and
put this to -- as you know I think it's been proven over
and over again

a GallUp poll shows that most of the peo-

ple in the country would g
was stated to them.
CHAIRMAN:

B

1 of Rights if it

That's something that .....

That isn't before us today.

MR. BARDSLEY:

Well, this is very close to one of the
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issues, isn't it?

I think -- parenthetically, I think it

very interesting -- this was a plurality decision by the
United States Supreme Court that allows this 10 to 2 verdict.
One of those Justices

Justice Blackmun, a conservative

Supreme Court Justice

said he thought it necessary to write

a concurring opinion saying, "I think this is constitutional,
but I want to make sure that everybody realizes that were I
sitting on a State Legislature I think this is bad policy,
and I wouldn't do it."

Now I think that's something that,

again, you should bear in mind.

This is Justice Blackmun,

a conservative Justice of the United States Supreme Court,
and but for his one vote we wouldn't even be here today, because
the issue wouldn't be before us.

So, it's that fundamental,

and I think the change so fundamental an aspect of our law
we ought to have more proof than I've seen.

Mr. Philibosian

says I get these statistics by walking down the hall and
talking to my attorneys.

That's pretty weak evidence I

think for changing our whole system of justice.
CHAIRMAN:

I appreciate your response.

MR. BARDSLEY:
CHAIP~~:

Thank you.

Thank you very much for being with us.

Pro-

fessor Leo J. Flynn.
PROFESSOR FLYNN:
of the staff.

Mr. Chairman, Senators and members

I gather what you want to talk about is my

research, since apparently that's the major piece of empirical data before you.

Under contract to the Office of

Criminal Justice Planning back in 1974 the same issues were
before Legislators and Criminal Justice Planners, and the
question asked was, "What do we know about hung juries and

can we get any empirical
the same data void

ndlc on the problem?"

So, we had

t you seem to be facing today, so we

attempted to find out how many hung juries

were and

what we could find out about them.
What we did is we had three types of data we used for
our study.Onc,lvnsinformation reported by the superior courts
to the Administrative Officer of the California Courts;
ond piece of data was local superior court information kept;
and the third was data we had to construct ourselves.
of

First

all, at the time we did our study in 1975,most counties

could not tell you how many hung juries there were.

They

could tell you how many verdict juries there were, and how
many "other" verdicts there were, of which hung juries were
a subset.

So, we had to go and pull the minute orders for

each and every case that was on "other" and determine which
cases were legitimately hung juries and which cases were
cases

ere the defendant died or something happened in the

meantime.

So, we were able to come up with some 1000 trials

that we identified as hung juries, 900 and some odd of which
we had useful information on.
1971,

'72 and '73.

some odd cases.

And this is for three years --

This was out of a total of nearly 8,200

We attempted to make some comparisons be-

tween the data we have on hung juries and the verdict juries
the juries which carne in either to acquit or convict.
I can see that you all want to go to

And

, so I'll attempt

to indicate what we found.
We attempted to ask some of these questions .....
CHAIRMAJl:

Quite to the contrary.

-79-

We can come back after

lunch if we need to or we can run over I think without a
problem.

No, we are not -- we are listening to you.

PROFESSOR FLYNN:
to do.

Thank you, Senator.

What we attempted

First of all, we attempted to find could we -- from

the data we had on defendants and on crime types -could we,
for instance, could we confirm District Attorney Philibosian's
feeling, or opinion, or conclusion, I don't know where the
evidence was.

But, let's say it's a popular feeling among pro-

secutors, and others, that sexual crimes inordinately are more
likely to end up in hung juries.

Well, we found some slight

evidence, but when we took all the crimes and disaggregated
them by property and different types, it wasn't strong enough
statistically to be able to say, "Ah, this sample, this shows
that sexual crimes are more likely to end up in hung juries
than any other kind of property, personal crimes, or other
crimes."

I mean, I'm not saying it didn't exist, I'm just

saying our data base didn't indicate it.
Then we attempted to ask the question, "Ah, what about
race?

What about minority status, at least the kind" -- we

obviously couldn't look at all kinds of minorities, we could
only look at race and sex, and to some extent criminal background, and again we couldn't detect anything in our analysis
of the different variables which would indicate that the defendants in hung jury cases are any different from the verdict
jury defendants.

So, in other words, the system doesn't seem

to show that any type of crime or type of defendant is singled
out.
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Then we attempted to go on with our study and attempt
to look at the cases, because we couldn't tell anything from
this, and see how long

e

took.

C<l

jury cases deliberated 1
even by crime type.
require unanimity.

Yes, all the hung

than the average verdict jury,

But, that's not surprising, because you
Normally

will send the jury back.

e judge under California law

So, we found, yes, they can consume

more time, but from that we were unable to conclude anything
other than they took more time.

vJe didn't have any data which

would tell us, was this the result of an irrational or biased
.

.

.

?

juror, or was it the result of a consc1ent1ous JUror·
viously something you would 1
tainly like to know.

Ob-

to know, and I would cer-

And, then as others have said, what we

found about the disposition is that the average jury in our
sample was sent back at least twice by the judee·
obviously was

te d

ple of the 8,000 verd

ferent from the sar::t juries.WP found that only about 10%

of those cases involved the jury being sent back.
that of the hung jur

This

s, of

We found

e 900 and some odd hung juries

that we had, 40% of those juries -- of those cases -- were
loter dismissed.
The data simp

Now we don't know why they were dismissed.
wasn't there, but this is the kind of infor-

rnation I think a future study would want to have.

Were they

dismissed because witnesses were tired, intimated, memories
were cold, or were

ssed because these are cases in

which consideration by the prosecutor indicated that they
were unlikely to subsequently result in a verdict, or at
least in a probable conviction.
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We don't know.

There is no

way we could answer that.

We simply know that 40% of these

cases disappear after the original dismissal of this jury
before it reached a verdict.
Of the remaining cases 34% of the defendants pleaded
guilty.

Another 30 some odd

I'm sorry.

26%·--of there-

maining cases are acquitted, and the rest are convicted.

So,

a very small number are convicted on a second jury trial,
though over 60% actually are convicted of some crime -- either
by pleading guilty because they know what's going to happen,
or because they are offered a deal, or convicted on second
retrial.

And that's essentially what we were able to find.

As I said, I think our great finding was to be able to find
out how many juries there were that hung.

We attempted to

make some estimates on cost, and I certainly would .....
CHAIRMAN:

Professor Flynn, before you get into costs.

Were there any statistics on how many hung up on the direction
of acquittal and how many hung up .....
PROFESSOR FLYNN:
in that.

Yes.

I'm sure you are very interested

I want to refresh myself here.

Yes.

We found that

in 62.6% of that whole sample the juries were hung in the
direction of conviction.

In 27.2% in the direction of acquittal,

and we have breakdown for each pairing.

For instance, 15.7%

were 11 to 1 for conviction; 13.6% 10-2 for conviction.
if you take those together you get over 29%.

So,

In other words,

you would increase by 29% the cases that would result in a
conviction.
were 1 to 11

On the other hand, for acquittal we have 5.9%

or 11 to 1 for acquittal, and 3.7 were 10-2

for acquittal, which gives you approximately 10% that would
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result in an acquittal verdict.
fall below the 1
of a verd

of cases that would permit either kind

t, and under

in automatic di
CHAIRMAN:

And the others would all

p

ssal of
So,

osal

SCA 10 would result

e c sc.

you went

example to 11 to 1 or

10 to 2 the percentage .....
PROFESSOR FLYNN:
CHAIRMAN:

30%?

PROFESSOR FLYNN:
CHAI Rl-1AN:

About 30% .....

..... more verdicts.

More verdicts in the direction of conviction?

PROFESSOR FLYNN:

Yes.

30% -- about 30% more convictions

and 10% more acquittals.

the difference in that number

I gave you -- 40%.
CHAIRMAN:
acquittals.

It would be 30% more convictions and 10% more

I'm looking at

PROFESSOR FLYNN:
So,

data.

Yes. I'm sorry-- it's 40%, right.

re would be a total of 40% more verdicts.
40% more verdicts, three-quarters would

CHAIR!-1AN:

be in the direction of .....
PROFESSOR FLYNN:

ters would be in the direction

Three

of conviction.
CHAIRHAN:

I 'w s

MR. THOMSON:

d.

You're

You had a point'

ing about percentage of the

number of hung juries, not of the total ..... ?
PROFES
question.

FLYNN:

No.

Not at all.

In other words,

of 900 and some o
not be 30% more cr

That is a well taken

t's the percentage of this sample

cases that we're talking about.

It would

1 convictions in California.

It would
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still be a very miniscule number overall, if this data is
still valid today.
CHAIRMAN:

Why don't you continue.

PROFESSOR FLYNN:

I just .....

Well, the only other thing is that

we attempted to make an estimate of time and cost and this
estimate is simply based on the best approximation we could
make at the time.

We used data from the Executive Officer

of the Los Angeles Superior Court, Frank Zolin, at the time,
who costed out a courtroom time in terms of the judge, the
jury, the attaches, the bailiffs, the actual physical facilities, in dollars and we looked at time consumed -- actual
time consumed by our cases as compared to time consumed by
the average verdict case, and we found that nearly $7 million
was the cost of all these 900 cases, based on the statistics.
Now, remember this is the Los Angeles County and we included
in this 9 other counties where the cost might have been different.

The time I think would be different.

The 978 hung

jury trials we studied consumed more than 2,912 days, about
10% more time than the verdict juries, and that led us to the
nearly $7 million figure.

I wish I had more conclusive infor-

mation to draw from this, but .....
CHAIRMAN:

Is it then valid to approximate by using a

40% of that $7 million to conclude that if those juries, under
a 10-2 system, had not hung you would have saved $3 million?
PROFESSOR FLYNN:
approximation,

It's valid if you accept this as a valid

and I'm sure people would quibble.

Some people

would probably -- say Solano County, which is one of the counties in our sample -- I believe is one of them -- would probably
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say the cost isn't ash

, there might be some difference,

but I think it would g

you the best approximation you can

get.

you assumed

Now you might,

is data as valid today,

I'm sure the Rand Corporation which has done more recent
studies, might be

le to give you a cost figure that's eloser

to the mark.
CHAIRMAN:

OK.

I should again underline that we are

talking about this statistical pool and the $7 million cost
to approximately try those .....
PROFESSOR FLYNN:
CHAIID~AN:

Right.

Richard says

MR. THOMSON:

People wanted to know this .....
t's not correct.

You wouldn't save $3 million, because that

amount would have been spent to try the cases .....
PROFESSOR FLYNN:
MR. THOMSON:
ings would

Right .

. . . . . that came from the verdict.

The sav-

, a) the cost of the retrials, and I don't know

if the Professor has the figure for that or not; and
b) the cost of the additional jury deliberations which I suppose would be significantly less than $3 million.
PROFESSOR FLYNN:
CHAIRMAN:

Right.

You're saying because not each case would be

retried, the $3 million figure would not apply.
MR. THOMSON:

Right, because that money would have been

spent in the trial that came to a verdict under the 10-2
proposal.
PROFESSOR FLYNN:

You are quite accurate.

We simply

looked at those cases and how much they cost, using the time.
Then we said take a 10% figure of that --we assumed that's the
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incremental cost for the total trial days we have on the
first trial, and that would be a saving, and then add to that
the subsequent trial -- about 60% of cases that are tried
again, and I can't remember if we have data.

This document,

by the way, you made reference to the article I published in
Judicature.

That came out of data which we generated in an

empirical study of the frequency of occurrence, causes
and effects, and amounts of time consumed by hung juries,
which was done for the Office of Criminal Justice Planning in
1975, and the data base is still available to you.
SENATOR DAVIS:
CHAIR~~N:

Senator Davis.

SENATOR DAVIS:
PROFESSOR FLYNN:
SENATOR DAVIS:
with the facts.

Mr. Chairman.

Are you a lawyer, Mr. Flynn?
No, I am not.
It was very impressive to hear you stick

I just wish that they would get law pro-

fessors to be able to relate to facts.

After all in a cri-

minal trial that's what it is supposed to be about, we get
such a plethora of emotions and philosophy, cultism and so
forth, that it's torturous trying to dig the facts out.

I

want to commend you for maintaining your scholarly objectivity.

It was very impressive.
PROFESSOR FLYNN:

had more information.

Well, thank you, Senator.

I wish I

I'm surprised that having continued

to follow this research, how little there really is -- I mean
it's a difficult area to research and understand, and I certainly hope that your renewed interest will generate attempts
to get, if nothing else, to get more detailed data, which I am
sure is very valid.

The District Attorney comes here and says,
_Qh_

"Look, I know this happens all the time," and I have no reason to believe that he is wrong.

Now we want to know how much

of the time we would want -- I hope to get to those cases
early enough so maybe we could learn more about the specifics
of the case, and maybe if you could convince some district
attorneys to set up a system to detect hung juries early,
that the state agency or scholars might be able to develop
at least more detailed information than I'm aware that exists
today.
CHAIRMAN:

According to an earlier witness, if I'm para-

phrasing him correctly, there is no need to delay for the
establishment of further empirical basis for this movement,
because the polls are so overwhelmingly clear that were that
data available and were a public education campaign to take
place, it's doubtful public opinion would shift very much.
What are your feelings on that?
PROFESSOR FLYNN:
would shift.

I really don't know if public opinion

My only comment is, being conversant with polls,

I have to be somewhat dubious about the authority of the
polls at this point.

I'm not saying people didn't answer in

this way, but it's like taking a poll before Prop. 15.

If you

had taken one early you'd find somebody'd come back and say
70% of the people favor gun control.

I'm not saying this

necessarily came out this way, but, of course, after Prop. 15
the public completely swung around.

My guess is that this is

the same kind of issue that complexity would lead to change.
I don't know what direction the change would go.

So, I'm not

against the polls; I don't think they are invalid, but I probably
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think on an issue as complicated as this they are not very
directive in and of themselves.
CHAIRMAN:

Any further questions of Professor Flynn?

SENATOR PRESLEY:
CHAIRMAN:

Mr. Chairman.

Senator Presley.

SENATOR PRESLEY:

You referred to the Rand Corporation

PROFESSOR FLYNN:

Well, Rand has done a number of studies.

SENATOR PRESLEY:

Not one on this specific .....

PROFESSOR FLYNN:

No, sir.

study.

But, what they have done,

both in civil and I think in criminal cases, they've probably
got the best cost data.

They've done a lot of studies both

for the state, but many more for the federal government, in
which they have had to gather information.

So, when someone

asks what would seem to be a fairly simple question, "how much
does a trial cost?"

Well, you get on the telephone to Frank

Zolin, or to the Clerks of any of these municipal courts and
you will find how unlikely you are to get a fairly straighforward answer to what seems like a simple question.

It turns

out -- when you push it it turns out that the question is more
complicated than I naively assumed it was when I asked.

But,

Rand, I think, has probably the best data on asking that kind
of question.
CHAIRMAN:
morning.

Thank you very much for being with us this

Unless there is serious objection on the part of one

of the witnesses, we are going to break for lunch and come
back at -- we will resume again at 2:00 o'clock p.m.
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CHAIID1AN:

OK.

We will resume with our hearing.

Our

last witness was Professor Flynn and we will now hear from
Greig Fowler.
MR. FOWLER:

My name is Greig Fowler.

I'm President-

elect of the California Trial Lawyers Association.
taking office on December

1.

I'll be

This, as I'm sure you all know

the members of the committee -- is a civil plaintiffs' trial
Bar composed of approximately 5500 members.

We speak strongly,

very sternly in opposition to anything but a unanimous verdict
in criminal cases, in this state or anywhere.
At first blush it might seem that any proposal that
would lead to increased efficiency in the courts, and to possibly help the tremendous backlog in civil cases would be
appealing to us, but, in this particular case justice sacrificed at the altar of efficiency, in this case, is not satisfactory to us.

I have been briefed on what Professor Uelman

has spoken on this morning, and I am in agreement with his
proposals and do not intend to rehash them.

I would like to

emphasize something that I personally think is very important
and should be considered by this committee.

The thought of

having less than a unanimous verdict, taking someone's liberty
away with only 10 out of 12 agreeing beyond a reasonable doubt,
or turning the coin over, acquitting somebody who may be guilty
by this same burden, does not seem proper.

It has been our

experience -- my case, 18 years of practice, almost exclusively
in civil cases, and in speaking with many others, that jurors
who may vote in a poll that they would wish to see less than
a unanimous verdict in a criminal case to promote efficiency,
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when these jurors are actually put to the task of deliberating, that's a very important word to consider -- the importance
of deliberation -- they take this task very seriously, and the
thought to us, again of having someone incarcerated or acquitted based on only a five-sixths verdict does not seem proper.
I just want to emphasize that jurors take their job, I would
say, 99% of the jurors take the task very seriously, and to
eliminate these inalienable rights based on some sort of a
five-sixths verdict, or possibly getting the ball rolling to
something even less than that, is not acceptable and is not consistent with the justice system in this country, the greatest
justice system in the world, that the world has ever
that this country has built up.

known,

Societies and countries are

judged by how they treat their accused, and I think that any
dilution in the finest jury system, the finest system of justice ever created by man would not be acceptable and would
not be proper and right.

So, I would ask -- we just register

our very strict opposition to this proposal.
CHAIRMAN:

Thank you.

Can you respond to a couple of questions?

Senator -- is that Senator Davis?
SENATOR DAVIS:

Senator Davis.

Are non-unanimous jury verdicts allowed

in civil cases?
MR. FOWLER:

Yes, and that would be 9 out of 12, and that

has been in effect for some considerable period of time, and
my response to that, we are dealing with the type of cases I
handle, amounts of money or transfers of property, or whatever, and that's the way the system has been.

When you talk

about personal liberty, you know, incarceration .....
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SENATOR DAVIS:

My next question about the non-unanimous

civil verdict, what was the position of your Association at
the time that legislation was pending?
MR. FOWLER:

I don't believe that our Association was

in existence when that was put in effect, because we have
been in existence since 1962 and it is my belief that the
non-unanimous jury long preceded that, sir.
SENATOR DAVIS:

Do you think the civil defense Bar, if

they had the option, would go back to unanimous verdict away
from the 9-3?
MR. FOWLER:
been proposed.

I can't answer that, because it has not
I think we are just dealing with apples and

oranges, Senator, when we are talking about this type of
thing.

It could be that what is proposed here is more effi-

cient, but I think in one case you are dealing with apples
and the other thing with oranges, and that's why it's .....
SENATOR DAVIS:

As the plaintiff's lawyer you like the

9-3?
MR. FOWLER:

The 9-3 is acceptable.

I would have no

problem with the unanimous verdict system in civil cases.
SENATOR DAVIS:

You don't think it would have made any

difference in whether or not you win a case?
MR. FOWLER:

I think the system might be a little more

efficient in certain cases, but I think -- really when you
get down to a jury talking about amounts of money, and so
forth, they can basically come to an agreement.

When you are

talking again about a person's liberty I think it's a different thing entirely.
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SENATOR DAVIS:

Well, isn't talking about their livelihood

and their property, and so forth, also an extremely important
thing?
MR. FOWLER:
about that.

It certainly is.

There is no question

But, I have heard no great opposition to the

system as we have it now from our members going through the
years.

So, that's something I've not considered .....
SENATOR DAVIS:

There is all kinds of criticism, espec-

ially from the defense Bar, that thinks that what's happened
in the courts in terms of justice for the defense has been
terrible, and your Association slams down ana kills any kind
of decent product liability reform, and you like it, you want
it your own way, and you get it that way.

I want to commend

you for the effective .....
MR. FOWLER:

Well, Senator, what we want is safer pro-

ducts and less people injured-- that's what we want.

It may

put us out of business, but -- and we think the most effective
way to -- one of the most effective ways to do that besides
legislation is to let the manufacturers know that if they
put a defective product on the market that injures somebody,
they are going to have to pay for that.

If they don't put a

defective product on the market they have nothing to worry
about.
SENATOR DAVIS:

Would you support legislation for an in-

nocent warehouseman or wholesaler who doesn't tamper with
anything, and doesn't know anything about it, to protect him
from being dragged in by trial lawyers and those people having to
put up sums of money for five and six and seven years to defend
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themselves and then they are exonerated?
MR. FOWLER:

Well, Senator Davis, I personally wouldn't

do that, because that would go against the entire philosophy
of the Products Liability Law as it has been developed by
the courts over many years

the Henningsen case back in

1910; the Greenman case in 1962 to more subsequent cases.
What we have gotten from that are safer products.
SENATOR DAVIS:

But, you have a lot of innocent people

warehousemen, wholesalers who are harmed in the process.

I

hope to see the same compassion for them that you have for
the criminal defendant, when you take over on December 1.
1:-lR. FOWLER:

And I might add that we do have unanimous

verdicts in civil cases in federal courts, and we live with
that and we don't complain about that.
CHAI&~:

Senator Presley.

SENATOR PRESLEY:
system in the world
it is.

Thank you.

You said we have the finest justice
I don't know if that's true, but I hope

I guess the ansHer we always have had after

that statement is "Justice for whom?"

\!Ve

make

And would you say that

the present system is skewed in favor of the defendant over
the victim?
MR. FOWLER:

No, I don't think so.

If we are staying

within the parameters of the legislation, the amendment that
is proposed, no, not at all.

You are simply asking 12 peers

to listen to all the evidence, to reasonably deliberate, and
to

come to a decision, and as you know, the amendment as

proposed by you, sir, would cut both ways.

As I say, there

would be acquittals when there might not should be.
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If we don't have this full deliberative process -- oh, sure
there are efficient ways of doing things.

I mean they have

very efficient ways in Russia .....
SENATOR PRESLEY:

I don't question that statement.

You're

talking in terms of dollars, but this probably would be the
more efficient way (inaudible)

We are concerned whether or

not real justice is being done for the victims versus the defendants.

We had a discussion this morning about all the re-

straints that are placed on the process of the system, the
investigative procedures, the introduction of evidence, juries,
all those things seem to make it very, very tough to convict
the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. But, it seems that
we get to the point where the victim·has lost out there, and
they are raped and they are murdered, they are burglarized,
and they are robbed, and they have to suffer from that, and
they'll probably suffer, at least psychologically, for the
rest of their lives, and this person in many cases gets off
and goes on about his business.
MR. FOWLER:

I agree with all of these things.

I know

there is a hue and cry about these things, and we are all
very sympathetic with the victim.

But, again, when we get

down to the point of the accused and what should be done when
the accused is tried, and it just sticks in my craw, this
idea that this person will either be acquitted or convicted
when there are two -- and I like to consider all jurors reasonable people

some may not be, but we have to when we ap-

proach this bill consider it that way -- that two reasonable
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people or one reasonable person listens to all the evidence
and does not agree, that person should either be acquitted
or convicted.
SENATOR PRESLEY:

Maybe those people have reasons other

than the evidence.
MR. FOWLER:

They might.

He can never know.

We can

never know what has gone through the minds of all the jurors
in all the cases we've even tried or heard of.
know that.

We can never

We can only come up with what we consider to be

the best system, which I think we have now in terms of trying
criminal defendants, and if there were a better system in
another society, another country, certainly someone would
have come ahead with it.

But, as far as lessening that bur-

den to either convict or acquit, that's not the answer.
SENATOR PRESLEY:
MR. FOVJLER:

There were two states that have .....

I heard that.

Louisiana and Oregon. I

heard that.
SENATOR PRESLEY:

Are you familiar with what their re-

sults have been?
MR. FOWLER:

No, I'm not.

I'm sure that there has been

a greater efficiency; I'm not sure there have probably been less
hung juries and less retrials, and I'll concede that .....
SENATOR PRESLEY:

If we had, in those two states, and

I'm not sure either, but, it seems to me if in those two
states they found themselves doing a lot of injustice to the
defendants, that they would change back.

Louisiana, for ex-

ample, they testified this morning have done this since 1898;
and Oregon, I think, since 1934.
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So, if it's so bad that you

run the risk of thwarting a good criminal jus

system, you

think they would change back.
MR. FOWLER:
they are put in.

Well, things are rarely changed back once
I cannot speak for the experience in Oregon.

I know that in Louisiana the system started out when Louisiana
was originally a territory of France.
sumed guilty until proved innocent.
civil law which is the French burden.

The defendant was preThey still use the French
At least they've come

far enough where the burden is put on the prosecution.

It

may not be unanimous, but they did show some progress certainly since the time of the Louisiana Purchase.
SENATOR DAVIS:
MR. FOWLER:

You disagree with Napoleonic justice then?

Yes, I do.

I like their wine; I don't

like their justice.
CHAIRMAN:

We have a poll that was presented to us.

The

question was asked, Proposition 1 allows conviction on a jury
vote of 11 to 1 or 10 to 2.
in those cases.

The death penalty is not involved

The vote was more than 3 to 1 in favor of

that particular proposition.

So, I have a group of consti-

tuents who come up to me and say, "3 to 1, and more than 3 to
1 we favor going to an 11 to 1 or 10 to 2 jury."
spond, "Well, that's not a good idea because ..... "
want to hear an answer in 25 words or less.

And I reAnd they

How would you

complete that sentence?
MR. FOWLER:

Well, I would just -- I alluded to that by

simply saying that those that would answer a poll are in a
frame of mind where they are concerned about law and order
we all are -- they are in a frame of mind, but they should be
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in a different frame of mind if they were sitting on a jury,
or if they or one of their loved ones was accused of a crime.
And again it gets back to the fact that it's just unacceptable to take someone's liberty away without unanimity.
Answering a poll and sitting on a jury are two different things.
CHAIID-1AN:

But, concluding that it'· s unacceptable

provide the why?

doesn't

If I tell them now that it's not a good idea,

they are going to say, "Well, why not?"

Well, I'm going to

say, "Hell, because it's unacceptable."

What do I tell them?

MR. FOWLER:

Well, you can go on about the foundation of

our traditions for justice and due process.

You can tell

them that the system that we have developed in this country
provides a safeguard by this unanimity that an innocent person is not going to be convicted unless 12 of his or her peers
agree upon it to a standard which we call "a reasonable doubt
to a moral certainty," and that is an important
have in our society.
want to say this.

safe~uard

to

You may not, as an elected official,

It may result in certain cases, and it un-

doubtedly has, in certain guilty people going free.

But, the

important thing about our country and about how it was founded,
and how it has progressed, is that the innocent person is
not put away, is not put to death, or incarcerated, as so
many innocent people have been in totalitarian societies.
CHAIID1AN:

But, when guilty people go free, aren't in-

nocent people placed at risk?
HR. FOWLER:
CHAIID-1AN:
MR. FOWLER:

There's no question about it.
So, which innocent individual .....
We can't assure this by having less -- that
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it's going to be better by having less than a unanimous verdict, because you can certainly make an argument that guilty
people are more likely -- could be more likely to go free
if you don't have this unanimity on the jury.

You just keep

on turning that coin back and forth, and it works both ways.
I'm not saying that we should have 20 people on the jury, or
6 as we have in federal courts, but in the process -- and I'm
just going by the assumptions.

I believe in this very truly,

having talked to jurors -- you spend a lot of time when you
lose a case talking to jurors, I think more than when you
win one, about how they felt, and they just take this task
so seriously.

I think we can ask for nothing better than to

have 12 people taking that task seriously, and talking among
themselves, all twelve of them, and coming to a unanimous
verdict.
CHAIRMAN:

Thank you.

Sheriff Block.

Sheriff Sherman

Block.
SENATOR PRESLEY:
CHAIID1AN:

Mr. Chairman, just a little commentary.

Senator Presley.

SENATOR PRESLEY:

We hear the same thing all the time,

that it's in the interest of the accused, safeguards, and
tradition and all that seems to indicate that if they rode
heavy on the side of the defendant rather than the victim,
and the only thing historically and traditionally, meaning,
I suppose that because it built itself up over the years,
it's perfect, it can't be improved upon.
CHAIRMAN:

Thank you.

SHERIFF BLOCK:

Just a commentary.

Sheriff Block.

Thank you.
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Mr. Chairman, members of

this committee, I'm here to express my support for SCA 10 and
for the concept of less than unanimous juries in all but capital cases.

This particular provision is an integral part of

the initiative that is currently in circulation gathering
signatures, in which I have played an integral part in development and the support of that effort.

And the reason for

my support of this proposal and certain others, is that in
the 28 years that I have been in law enforcement as a member
of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, I have seen
many changes take place in the administration of criminal
justice, in the conduct of carrying out the public safety
responsibility, and among all of these changes I think the
most significant has been the ever growing complexity of the
criminal trial process.

There has been what I perceive as

a movement away from a search for the -- a legitimate search
for the truth toward a search for technical imperfection.

I

believe that our current jury system enhances that search
for technical imperfection.

We have a system wherein we

select 12 persons from the community, persons who are of
average intelligence -- at least we expect the juror to at
least be of average intelligence

persons who are subjected

to large amounts of testimony, some of a very technical,
highly emotional nature . They view exhibits which likewise
are of a highly technical nature at times. We then require
these people to adjourn to a jury room to deliberate and to
come to a single mind before we have a verdict.

Then the

same matter proceeds up through the appellate system, and at
each of the court levels, be it the Appellate Court or the
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Supreme Court, where we have very learned people, all we require is a majority of one in order to render the final
decision.
What I have seen happening with the trial process, particularly with the jury process, in the criminal courts of this
state, has been what I can only refer to as a perversion of
the original intent of the system.

I'm talking about this

growth of the new profession, if you will, of jury consultants -- individuals who go out and conduct interviews in
communities; individuals who monitor trials in progress; who
develop computer programs, establishing profiles of individuals who voted foraquittal

or conviction in a particular

type of case, or a particular charge was alleged, and then to
assist the attorneys in trying to select the jury as close
to the profile that has been established as possible to try
and benefit the person charged with the crime.

Recognizing

that even one such person on the jury, which may result in a
less than unanimous verdict, could cause the process to be
declared a mistrial and to start all over again.
Now, I've heard it referred to in this hearing, and
certainly in other debates on the issue that I have participated in, that this is the kind of process that takes place
in totalitarian countries.

The President of one of the Bar

Associations said that in Communist Russia they have speedy
trials.

I, first of all, resent the inference of any com-

parison between what is being advocated here and what goes
on in the totalitarian countries.

The State of

Oregon, which you referred to,

by any standard may be the
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most liberal state in the United States in dealing with individual rights and the administration of our criminal justice
system.

jury verdict
state.

have found that their less than unanimous

'f'hc y

--

10-2, 11 to 1

--

works very well for that

There have been many articles written by the appellate

justices of that state commenting on the validity of that process.

I might also submit that in this county, based upon

my own experience, where there have been verdicts of 10-2 or
11 to 1 for conviction, that probably in virtually 100% of
the cases, there has either been a retrial for the finding of
guilt or a plea of guilty to the charge and where there is
a 10-2 or 11-1 split verdict for acquittal there has probably
not been a refiling of the charges.

So, I believe that,

while this less than unanimous verdict will in fact eliminate
the requirement for new trials in a number of instances, it
will not in any way affect what is the current administration
of criminal justice, either in this community or in this state.
CHAIRMAN:

Any questions of the Sheriff?

If the purpose

is to weed out the juror who is unresponsive to the evidence;
an obstinate juror; a juror who isn't capable of understanding the evidence; a juror who perhaps is corrupt in some
fashion, I take it that that is a sufficiently rare circumstance that the likelihood of having two on the same jury is
quite small, and if so why do we have to move to a 10 to 2?
Why wouldn't an 11 to 1 suffice to weed out that occasional
juror that cannot play a part in the system?
SHERIFF BLOCK:

Because we have a track record that has

been established in the State of Oregon that we have some
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this proposal that it was being advocated as such a dramatic
break with tradition.

Yet, it's interesting when decisions

have come down from the United States Supreme Court that have
had a dramatic impact on our ability to provide for the public
safety of this community, decisions which have had dramatic
breaks with tradition, I have not heard the hue and cry about
forget what the U. S. Supreme Court said or forget about tradition

Let's go with what the Supreme Court has indicated, and

that's what we're doing here.

I believe that the right to

trial by jury of peers is being met; I believe that five-sixths
constitutes a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt; I believe the
moral certainty aspect is being met; and obviously the United
States Supreme Court believes the same thing, and who am I to
quarrel with the United States Supreme Court on a matter if it's
of constitutional importance.
CHAIRMAN:

You mean you've never questioned the wisdom

of the Supreme Court decisions?
SHERIFF BLOCK:

I certainly have, but the point that I'm

making is that you can't have it both ways.

We have

been told that we do not enjoy the luxury -- or should not
enjoy the luxury-as law enforcement of enforcing the law or
doing our job based upon those laws that we agree with, or
those decisions that we agree with

I submit to the op-

ponents of this proposal that they play by those same rules
and not take positions based upon what I have to believe.
I guess one point I have to make

I don't know if it's fair

and proper -- but we should look at the proponents and the
opponents of this thing and evaluate whose vested interests
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initiative, and the part that we talked about and referred
to was the success of the Oregon experience and quoted from
a number of papers that had been developed by appellate
court justices with

SENATOR PRESLEY:

that state.

Was the initiative endorsed by the

Criminal Justice group-- the one that was formed ..... ?
SHERIFF BLOCK:

That group, the one you are referring to,

does not take a stand on ballot propositions, and so forth,
but the Countywide Criminal Justice Coordinating Council,
which is made up of myself; Chief of Police of Los Angeles;
a representative of local small town chiefs of police; District Attorney; Public Defender; City Attorney; Mayor of Los
Angeles; somebody representing the other Mayors; presiding
Judges of the Courts -- some 20 members.

When the proposal

was put before the committee for a vote to go forward or not
to go forward, there was only one vote in opposition.

The

Public Defender voted in opposition; all other members of
the Countywide Committee voted in favor of the proposal.
SENATOR PRESLEY:
SHERIFF BLOCK:

Is that the PJ of the Superior Court?
The PJ of the Superior Court, Munici-

pal Court of both Los Angeles and President of the Presiding
Judges Association for Los Angeles County.
CHAI&~N:

Does the fact that we are talking about a

very small number of cases have any impact on your thinking
on this issue?

We went through some statistics earlier be-

fore you arrived that indicate that we are talking about a
couple of cases at the most out of 100 that would be affected
by this.
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So, I believe it's a problem that will grow in

frequency, and will work against

wh~.t

I believe is a legi-

timate search for the truth.
CHAIRMAN:

And you don't believe 10-2 is overkill?

SHERIFF BLOCK:

I do not believe that 10-2 is overkill,

and I might add -- while it is not part of SCA 10, we also
have in the initiative a provision that if there are 7 votes
for acquital, that unless there Gan be a showing by the people that there is evidence available that was not available
in the original trial, that would be a bar to prosecution.
So, the proposal is designed to, once again, to be fair,
proper administration of criminal justice, recognizing both
the legitimate rights of the accused, but at the same time
recognizing the legitimate rights of the rest of society,
which, among other things, haq to pay the bill for what
goes on.

In Los Angeles County the cost is somewhere between

$4500 and $5000 a day to administer a single Superior Court.
CHAIR}~:

Again, you don't believe that 10-2 is over-

kill?
SHERIFF BLOCK:
CHAIRMAN:

I do not.

The reason for that is that it works in

Oregon?
SHERIFF BLOCK:

It works in Oregon.

It is my under-

standing that it works in .....
CHAIRMAN:

Could it be overkill in Oregon?

SHERIFF BLOCK:

I don't believe so.

I do not believe

it's overkill.
CHAIRMAN:

I understand that, but why?
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similar cases throughout the country.

There have been other

cases where they go out, hire a jury consultant and prior
to the trial the consultant will go out and conduct interviews on the street -- perhaps hundreds of people -- getting
background information on them -- their age; their occupation; their income level; whatever, and then say, "If you
were made aware that a male adult, 35 years old, had sex with
a 17-year old girl, and she consented, although that may be a
technical violation of the law -- if you were sitting on this
jury would you find this person guilty of statutory rape;
would you find them guilty, and then if you learned that this
17-year old female had a record of sexual promiscuity ..... "
They develop all this information, computerize it, and they
then look at the list and decide that, you know, a male white,
42 years old, and a certain range of occupation, or economic
level, may be the best person to have on this jury for our
side.

If that is selecting a jury of peers, and if that's

what was designed by the framers of our criminal court system, then I've missed something in my 28 years, I'll tell
you that.
SENATOR PRESLEY:

Was this -- in the case that you

mentioned -- was this person paid by taxpayer funds?
SHERIFF BLOCK:

Would have to be, because it was a

court-appointed attorney.
SENATOR PRESLEY:

Mr. Chairman, is that an extension of

voir dire, a rather long extension of what has been described
here?
MR. THOMSON:

I think the way to get at it would be

to limit voir dire.
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MR. TALCOTT:
committee.

Good afternoon Senator and members of the

I am Robert Talcott.

afternoon as a representat
Association.

I'm appearing here this

of the Los Angeles County Bar

I might say at the outset, Senators, that the

consideration of SCA 10 was given exhaustive and thorough
consideration by the Trustees before they entered their vote
on whether to support or oppose it.

There were meetings

in which the District Attorney from Los Angeles County was
invited, judges from the Superior Court were invited, arguing in favor of the Constitutional Amendment.

There were

parties brought in that were setting forth arguments against
it.

These meetings with the debate went on and lasted over

several days; they occurred at open meetings of local Bar
leaders; and after consideration and questioning, the digesting of all of the arguments pro, and all of the arguments con with respect to Senator Presley's Constitutional
Amendment, the unanimous conclusion of the Trustees of the
local Bar Association-- which represents 17,000 lawyers,
which isn't even all the lawyers here in Los Angeles -- about
60% of the lawyers --but, representing those 17,000 lawyers, they met and unanimously concluded that they would
oppose SCA 10; that they were not convinced; they were not
impressed by the arguments.
CHAIRMAN:

Senator Presley.

SENATOR PRESLEY:

How many people were voting on this

decision?
MR. TALCOTT:

There were approximately 36 Trustees .....

SENATOR PRESLEY:

36 Trustees sat and heard all those
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MR. TALCOTT:
in opposition.

That's correct.

It was a unanimous vote

Now, while the question put to other people

testifying here today were illuminating, nobody is against
protecting victims; nobody is against a more efficient system when we talk about the administration of justice.

The

consensus was that this did not promote a fair administration of justice.

Senator Keene said,

to one of the other witnesses.
constituents, if they say to me,
idea?'"

11

Fill in the f.ast line,"

"\\!hat am I going to tell my
'well why isn't it a good

And I don't know that this will explain it, but

let me attempt to try to capsulize what some of the feeling
was among the people that I represent in the LA County Bar
Association.
They said, you know what this does?

If you allow 10

people to make the judgment, then we could envision a situation where the jury has listened to the evidence; they are
instructed by the judge; they retire to the jury room; and then
they say they select a foreman as is the usual procedure, and
the foreman says, "Let's take a straw vote right now and see
where we stand.
the other."

Let's see how far we have to go one way or

And everybody writes down on a piece of paper,

it's handed to the foreman, and the foreman unrolls each
piece of paper and tabulates the total.
he comes up with?

And you know what

10 for acquittal, or 10 for conviction,

and 2 taking the opposite side, whatever it might be in that
particular case.
gentlemen.

He said, "That wraps it up ladies and

You've done a hell of a job; let's move on; we

want to get out of here," signs the verdict and passes
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if you are convinced that view or opinion was erroneous."
Then the judge goes on to tell the jury, "But don't do so
don't surrender your honest conviction as to the weight of
the evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow
jurors or for the mere purpose of reaching a verdict."
abo~t.

It

says -- you know what's unique about our jury system?

It

What that does, it distills what we're talking

compells a discussion, and it's not a race for justice.

I

think if the Bar Association had to capsulize, Senator
Presley, for you or for Senator Keene to take back to his
constituents, or to Senator Davis, what we are concerned
about is the 10-2 verdict has the potential of undermining
the necessity and the responsibility to deliberate together
in and amongst themselves.
SENATOR DAVIS:
CHAIPJMAN:

I have a question.

Senator Davis and then Senator Presley.

SENATOR DAVIS:

Have you, Mr. Talcott, heard any criticiam

from the Bar in Oregon that when they went to 10-2 that
tended to cause the jury to disregard the opinions of one
or two jurors?

Have there been any studies to determine that?

Has there been any real objective analysis by any reseachers
to show whether or not that has happened?

I told the Chair-

man it's too bad we are not holding this hearing in Portland,
because I haven't heard any real objective factors here,
advocacy on both sides, most of the Bar being absolutely
negative.
years ago,
the riots,"

You fellows remind me of Chiefs of Police of 20
when people pointed and said, "You fellows cause
and I said, "No, we don't, we're perfect."
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and conducted a poll or a survey in Oregon.

I would sug-

gest that these hearings certainly are going to promote the
probability of a study being done, so that if there is further

discord that that would -- since you and others have

expressed an interest in how that experiment of long-standing
has been going, I would suggest that that will probably be
done at some time.

I do not have that information.

would like to answer you this way
you this way.

But, I

I would like to answer

I would suggest .....

SENATOR DAVIS:

I heard a tape just quit, and I didn't

want to lose any of your words of wisdom.
MR. TALCOTT:

I think that there exists in the United

States good justice, better justice, and the best justice,
and it might vary within the criminal justice system, the
administration of justice within the states.

I would sug-

gest to you that, although there may not be hues and cries
of dissent in Oregon and Louisiana, that that may not be the
best justice, and that's what all of us here today are really
seeking for and pursuing.

California is really a terrific

and unique state, because we have always striven for the
best in everything -- not just good.

Maybe that system works

in Louisiana; maybe it works in Oregon, and nobody is screaming and yelling to change it.
CHAIRMAN:

I am going to ask that you keep your remarks

a little bit briefer.

If you can condense them just a little

bit.
HR. TALCOTT:
CHAIRMAN:

I'm sorry.

Senator Presley.

-117-

s

t

been

s

jury

out

to

getting
j

room to

liberate

a

s

to be found guilty

one

I've never been a juror

pressures

s

that come to

t one

come around is

s person

st

son, or two p

s.

would have to be a very,

t you

d

I

some very,

s

very strong convict

If we had

a 10-2 jury they c
they could

1

those jur

s.

go

true

s;

over
beat over

I'm sure

but

rema

no.

over the

beat
and

to come
se

e

as a response,
how we are

the
to

't

stem,

understand

judges,

I know of, two

d ones that

we

es County

re

se tr

s

day, and I don' t
have so missed

can be so
point

on

ates just 1
se

this every day,

jur

s every

, and how they
scr

ed here.
t attorneys.

t

e attorneys,

you are as

but the judges

support this -- at

just

t

I can kind of understand
They are

, to

truct

who

with

one of

east two

them was

was
8

I

am sure there are others.
MR. TALCOTT:

I'm sure there are, and for the Bar Assoc-

iaton what has occurred is

t the evidence presented to

require the change has not been compelling or convincing.
One of the arguments that has been probably rehashed here
many times, is that it's economically sound to do that.

The

Bar Association was not convinced that that is a substantially
significant reason to change it because it saves money.

Now,

that may be a consideration for you, and properly so, but for
people involved in the justice system they don't feel that a
dollar sign should be the determination of whether or not
certain activities should occur or should not occur.
SENATOR PRESLEY:

Most of these other people that we

are talking about are proponents, are part of the justice
system, so you can't say you're involved in the justice system.
You're all-encompassing like that, including everyone.
MR. TALCOTT:

You're .....

I mean in the group that I'm representing,

they were not impressed by the monetary .....
SENATOR PRESLEY:

Are all your members defense-minded

attorneys?
MR. TALCOTT:

Not at all.

The Los Angeles County Bar

Association is a voluntary Bar and there is no mandatory requirement; it is not made up of defense lawyers, or plaintiffs'
lawyers.

It's made up of lawyers who are interested in the

administration of justice in this community, and that covers
everything -- civil, and what have you.

So, the argument

about the dollar sign was not compelling. What seems to be
the unstated agenda as the purpose of this was that they wanted
greater insurance of conviction, rather than having the recal-
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'sa

so
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to be able

urors are

e and
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one aberrat

But,

d

attention to a way

t

to

get-

ting into the box.

SENATOR PRESLEY:
proponents,

I

c

you are not
I

to the
they were

one

doing just on economic grounds.

MR. TALCOTT:
SENATOR

I

and you seem to be
more to it --

s a
I

t

case was

there is a lot
scribed here
can imagine

this
the

t

ssure

every kind of emotion, I guess, that you could imagine, that
the victim had to go through, and all of that.
four trials never saw just
part of this

--

CHAIRMAN:

e done.

And after

So, that's another major

it's not just economic.
Anything further?

Thank you.

I appreciate

I understand we have someone from the Los

your testimony.

Angeles County Chamber.
HR. LESAGE:

I don't have your name on .....

I'm Bernard LeSage, Vice Chair of the

Law and Justice Section of the Los Angeles Area Chamber of
Commerce.
CHAIRMAN:

OK.

MR. LESAGE:

That's Bernard .....

LeSage.

We have -- I'm here really to

say that the Board of the Los Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce has considered the non-unanimous criminal jury verdicts in connection with the Speedy Trial Initiative, or the
so-called "Speedy Trial Initiative," which has a few provisions which are slightly different than this, but essentially
encompass the same concept.

We have prepared as part of the

committee a summary of our arguments which we considered pro
and con.

I don't know

it will be helpful for you.

It

might shorten what I have to say here.
CHAIRMAN:

We'd love to have it, in any case.

MR. LESAGE:

Our committee heard many of the speakers

which you heard here this afternoon.
Delman, in favor.

Among others, Jerry

We discussed with many meetings the

drafters of the initiative; we heard from representatives of
the Police Department; from Distr
from the Public Defender's Office.

t Attorney's Office; and
Pretty much a cross

section of all of those particular associations who have
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s
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non-unanimous jury ver-
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to investigate the facts as to
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funda-

mental respect that we had for the jury system in general,
that the jurors in fact take on very seriously, to take the
duty upon themselves very

S('

iou:;ly

to consider very care-

fully the reasonable doubt of guilt, and that we felt that
the 10-2 under those circumstances would still result in a
fair trial, given the fundamental trust in the jury system.
The jury -- the composition of the jury has changed considerably from when it was f

st developed.

I think you

have all probably heard quite a history about it, but the
changing complexion of our society and, therefore, changing
complexion of the jury panels that we are faced with, seemed
to indicate that you have the possibility of a one juror
holdout, an unreasonable one juror holdout, or even two, is
not that uncommon

when we discussed it with various district

attorneys and public defenders who have experience in the
field, none of which -- although there was one member that
was a former district attorney and a former defense attorney
on our committee.

We went to those people who are in the

field and found that, although their experience was not extensive, they did not have a whole lot of cases that were
hung up by one apparently unreasonable juror, or two unreasonable jurors -- it did occur, and it was all their
experience as well that subsequent to just one or two persons
who are unreasonable they would try it again, and they always won, resulting in just really a waste of time.

Some

of those trials are not short trials, they go on for quite
some time, and there is a considerable amount of expense
resulting from it.

So, that sort of balancing of the expense,
-123-

essence
tr

sure

stem to

not an

one

answer, but our c
tive of the

a
a real

I

senta-

tee

of the

s community, came down

10-2, and I

's bas

there

where we are.

s that

are any questions I can answer those, or

s before our committee

we considered as significant

and against,

are here on the wr

as best we can construct them in a summary form,and that's
where we came down on it.
SENATOR DAVIS:

Are you an attorney, Mr. LeSage?

MR. LE SAGE:

s, I am.

SENATOR DAVIS:

LeSage means

}ffi. LE

SAGE:

se one, I guess.

Or wisecracker, I

SENATOR DAVIS:

1

t know which one.

In your committee did you

a unani-

mous verdict in favor of?
MR. LE SAGE:

We did indeed,

members who weren't

sent, and I

though there were two
ieve one

those mem-

bers probably would have voted against, or would have abstained, one of the two.
SENATOR DAVIS:

I want to commend you for the scholaDi-

ness of your presentation.

a pragmatic

It shows kind

business evaluation of the process which I find missing from
so many presentations.
He didn't try to
tell us the facts.
MR. LE SAGE:
SENATOR
MR. LE SAGE:

The Professor of Government came in.
us how we should think, he tried to

And so I .....
I think that was Jerry Uelman.
-- an

s.

did not
-1

i

name from Claremont.
him.

CHAIRMAN:

Before you leave, I too appreciate the degree

of thoughtfulness in weighing both sides of the argument and
the conclusions that you carne to.

I'm a 1

tle bit concerned

because I haven't seen -- perhaps you have -- some empirical
demonstration that there are a significant number -- let's
just take the 10-2 situation -- of hung juries where you have
two unreasonable jurors.

Obviously unreasonableness is to

some extent in the eyes of the beholder, and if I were at the
losing end of a case and felt there should have been a conviction, and that two people held out, I might consider their
actions unreasonable, even though to those people, and maybe
the rest of the world, their actions might be very reasonable.

Could you give us some insight into the kinds of cases

that were put before you, and whether there was actual data
put before you on whether these were people who were relating
situations that they had experienced, that stood out very
much in their minds, because they didn't like the results and
the outcome, and you had maybe a bad situation?
MR. LESAGE:

Well, I'll tell you what information we

did have so you can use that in your evaluation of taking our
comments and our decision that was made by the Board, and
that is that one of our members is Frank Zolin, who is the
Executive Director of the Los Angeles Superior Court, which
was our primary source for statistics on how many 10-2,
11-1 type of cases there are.

He has to admit, and I think

I would report to you here that there are no definitive
statements in Los Angeles County which establish exactly how
many of those types of cases there are that would fall within
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that type
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CHAIRMAN:

d

person

uncomfortable about that?

MR. LESAGE:

that
he is

Ami

justify the conclus

or

to

is

s

feels
data to

?

No.

I'll

where we came up --

the approximation of 350 tr

s is a 1

e misnomer here,
us who are in

because you are a state
Los Angeles, and Frank

sents the Los Angeles

County, that's an

based

s review of the

statistics that are available in Los Angeles County, which
have somewhat

the same

lier about certa

ssed ear-

percentages of

s

knowing certain

numbers and making assumptions about those
gures

to come to this type of conclusion

are availab

that in Los Angeles

would mean approximately 350 trials

that would be saved
a 10-2 conviction.

s and fi-

would provide

provision
And

we could do

as far as facts and statist

s

s County area.

We are trying to grapple with the same idea

what are we

talking about in terms of time when we are

ing to juxto-

pose that with the
are we looking for in

t's r

s?

s of savings

; also what types of savings are

we looking for in response to the victim so they don't have
to go through the

trial -- one tr

-1

s it hung

up and they come back to testify again about the blood and
detail.

Those types of considerations against making sure,

that we all wanted to make sure that the rights of the defendant were protected, but he has fundamentally a fair trial.
And when you start balancing those you can't come up with
hard numbers, and we looked long and hard -- we went to Steven
Trott, and I don't think he has any figures either --in fact
he came to our committee

actual figures.

I

think somebody

in the future will, because obviously they are ascertainable,
but they are not in existence as best we know it at this point
in time.

We may be mistaken, but we looked pretty hard for

them.

CHAIRMAN:

I guess one of the concerns I have in this

whole subject matter area is that if you look at the hung
juries and then you look at the 11-1 and 10-2s, there either
is some assumption being made that an 11-1 or 10-2 leaves the
one and the two people who hold out in an inherently unreasonable position, or someone has some knowledge somewhere that
there are a certain number of unreasonable holdouts, and
that the best that I have heard on that question is anecdotal
testimony, and we have sort of an inverted pyramid being
built up. Down there somewhere someone said,

Yes, I know

of an 11-1 case where the holdout was unreasonable and,
therefore, in all these cases the holdouts are unreasonable.
And yes, I know of a 10-2 case -- I haven't heard of a 10-2
case yet where the two holdouts have been demonstrated to
be unreasonable.

There was some suspicion given on the part

of one of the judges this morning that in a series
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d bigo
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I'm
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s
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10-2 cases.

s

think you probably

some,

I

many are un-

't

reasonable.

MR. LE SAGE:

Right.

blems with

I

's one

es on the

the proand

we have

s

recognize it as a problem, because you have to assume that
that one person, if diligent, has reasonable doubt as to
that person's guilt for that particular crime.

The only

thing that you can rely upon is

the best judgment of

those p

those types of situa-

been involved

tions, such as the defense and prosecuting
then poll the jurors afterwards

try

s, who
asc

as

best they can -- and even then they are not absolutely certain, because that's certainly within -- something that's a
subjective

ement

can never even be cer

exactly what the basis was, whether
able basis, or whether
it.

I

an unreason-

was

was some rea

then

e

sis for

think that where you have to come down on that is

that where you have a s

ten people who have ser-

iously considered the evidence, even though there may be
one or two people who have a reasonable doubt as to that
person's guilt .....

CHAIRMAN:

Are you talking about the decison of the

jury?

MR. LE

of

-1

j

-- let's say you

get to the -- let's take a premise of 10-2 or 11-1 for conviction, and that person will be found guilty under this particular format.

We'll never really know whether that person

had a reasonable doubt which was justified by the evidence,
or whether it was just some preconceived aspect of this person's personality which sort of led him to interpret the
evidence unreasonably, or whatever the cause was, they have
decided that he is not guilty.

You will never really under-

stand that no matter how long you compute those figures, and
I

think fundamentally you have to come to the conclusion in

order to support this position

and I

think this is where

our committee and the Board came to -- is that where you have
12 people making that serious effort and not taking away
anything from those one or two people who are found not guilty,
but you probably have a very safe and more than a safe, you
have a probability, and I

think more than a probability you

have someone who is probably guilty, and that that person
probably ought to serve a sentence, perhaps taking into consideration those other two juror's verdicts, but whatever,
that person is guilty of that particular crime.

I mean,

that person got a fair trial and, therefore, whatever the
unreasonableness -- you really can't couch it that way, because there is no way to completely ever understand that.
CHAIRMAN:

Can a probably guilty person be an innocent

person?

MR. LE SAGE:

Do you mean could there be a mistake in

the system with a 10-2?
CHAIRHAN:

Isn't it more likely .....
-129-

MR. LE SAGE:

d be a

more 1

se,
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is
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dovm
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You have a certain

and Assemblymen.

ing rendered on a particular
innocence, or not.

j

Senators
s be-

's guilt or

sue, whether

you get involved in that

The more

process perhaps the better integrity you have for a correct
result.

But, at some point you

to

able judgment in a particular case
with 12 people unanimous, or

what

a reason-

you cannot ever, even

people unanimous, or 100 peo-

ple unanimous, you still can't come to that conclusion that
that person really is guilty.

I mean there is always the

possibility that that person was framed, that some other
circumstances about him .....
CHAIRMAN:

Even with a unanimous

MR. LE SAGE:
CHAIP~N:

t?

Even with a unanimous verdict.

If you dilute to some extent -- if

di-

lute to some extent the perfection of the decision-making
process to the extent it's achievable,
benefits?

t are the offsetting

You mention the cost benefits, or efficiency bene-

fits, that are considered.

Were there any other benefits

that the Chamber in particular considered in coming to its
conclusion, besides the question of cost effec

ss and

efficiency?
MR. LE SAGE:

Well, I think fundamentally

wasn't

so much as putting a scale and adding the benefits versus
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the burdens.

If you come to the position that you are funda-

mentally going to have 12 people who are going to do the best
job they can, and that this person gets a fair trial, and 10
people come to the conclusion that he is guilty, then we're
satisfied as a society that that person is guilty.

And I

think the benefits go from all the way down the line.

I mean

there's money benefits obviously; there are benefits to the
victims; there are benefits to resolving that issue, even
from the defendant's point of view, because if you look at
those figures that are available from the numbers that go
back into the system and are convicted, it's very close to
100% the second time around, whether it's the perfection of
the lawyer's skills, or whether you have just another jury
panel, or what, there are very, very, very few instances
where you have that unreasonable jury situation where the
second time around the person is not convicted by a unanimous verdict jury.

And I think that the integrity of the

system includes a judge who is attuned to that, the prosecutor
who won't prosecute again if there is a reasonable doubt, and
those types of things are built into a system because there
are a lot of people out there trying to make sure that just
results happen.

The judge is there, the attorneys are

there from both sides, you have 12 jurors there, and everybody really there is trying to make sure that we only convict the guilty and that the free person is let off.

I

think the system is still going to work, but it will work
a little more efficiently with 10-2.

You know you can't --

you cannot get ..... It is a philosophical issue I think to a
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certain extent, and
looking for.

is no

d answer

I don't think you are

are

to find the hard

answer.
CHAIRMAN:
sponses.

I

responses, your direct re-

I think you have

helpful to me

is necessary in order to cormnit the

What vote

to a position

on an issue such as this?
MR.

SAGE:

In

particular case -- I was at

meeting -- of our meeting -- which was unanimously voted.
CHAIRMAN:

It happened to be unanimous.

But, was a

unanimous vote required?
MR. LE SAGE:
I don't know

No.

It was just a majority.

And also

we lacked a quorum the

any -- we had a

first time that this issue came up to the Board of Directors.
They voted without a quorum 100% and I understand without
having been there, everybody else who wasn't there eventually voted in favor of this as well.

So, that the Board

of Directors, which represents sort of a cross section of
the business in Los Angeles County -- and those are the Directors themselves -- I am not a Director.

The Chair of our

Committee is a Director, but the Directors themselves are
the only ones who can vote

take a position on

behalf of the Chamber for this.

It is my understanding that

they voted unanimously in favor of this.
SENATOR DAVIS:
CHAIP~N:

:t:1r. Chairman.

Senator

SENATOR DAVIS:

Is

true that the Greater Los Angeles

Chamber of Commerce Board of Directors encompasses Los
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Angeles County and San Bernardino County, and Riverside
County, and Orange County?
MR. LESAGE:

Yes.

It's the Greater Los Angeles Area--

Los Angeles Southern California .....
SENATOR DAVIS:
MR. LESAGE:

It's the great basin.

Yes.

It's the Ventura, Santa Barbara,

I think, Orange County.

How far out -- I think it does go

San Bernardino and Riverside as well. So, it's a big chunk
of area.

However, obviously .....

SENATOR DAVIS:

Is part of it Los Angeles City and Los

Angeles County?
MR. LESAGE:
CHAIR}~N:

MR. LESAGE:
CHAIRMAN:
testimony.

Yes.

That's true.

It follows the LA Metropolitan Water District.
I think that's about right.
Mr. LeSage, thank you very much for your

Is there anyone else here today who would care

to testify on this issue?
for attending.

If not, thank you all very much

Oh, I have one announcement to make.

SENATOR DAVIS:

I would like you and Mr. Thomson to

consider the practicality of going to Portland and listening
for one day and maybe going to New Orleans and listening for
one day to the Louisiana system .....
CHAIRMAN:

OK.

You've hit the good idea and the bet-

ter idea, but you haven't yet come to the best idea.

And

that was the one that you had at lunch -- that we study the
non-unanimous jury in London.
SENATOR DAVIS:

The 10-2 in all of Great Britain should

be investigated also.
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CHAIRMAN:

Well, we'

just wanted to announce

certainly look into
so

we

both pro-

ponents and opponents
not able to attend, or

I

measure

were

some reason did not attend.

the proponent side we did invite Evelle Younger,
Attorney General; and Justice Robert

On

former

are the co-

sponsors of the Criminal Courts Reform Initiative.

We in-

vited the California District Attorneys Association; and
we did invite Chief Daryl Gates.

On

the opposition side we

invited the Attorney General -- they were supposed to appear
and did not.

We invited the Friends Committee on Legisla-

tion -- they did not appear; and
Liberties Union.

so the American Civil

We also invited the County Supervisors;

the California Judges Association; the Judicial Council;
and the State Bar of California, the last four having as
yet taken no position on the Initiative -- on the Criminal
Courts Reform Initiative.

So, I just wanted you to know that

we tried to get as many as we could.
We are very pleased to have had your attendance.
you very much, members and staff, and all part
Sergeants, Special Services, Recorders.
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Thank

s concerned --
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SENATE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
No.

A

10

COMMITTEE MEMORANDUM ON

B

SCA 10
CO:t-.1MITTEE ANALYSIS OF SCA

10

c

Senate Constitutional Amendment

No. 10

Introduced by Senator Preseley
February 11, 1983

Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 10--A resolution to
propose to the people of the State of California an
amendment to the Constitution of the state, by amending
Section 16 of Article I thereof, relating to juries.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

SCA 10, as introduced, Presley. Juries: criminal causes.
Existing provisions of the constitution permit a verdict to be
rendered in a civil cause by three-fourths of the jury and
permit a jury to consist of 12 or fewer persons in misdemeanor
criminal actions.
This bill would provide that in a criminal action, other than
for an offense punishable by death, five-sixths of the jury may
render a verdict.
Vote: %. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no.
State-mandated local program: no.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Resolved by the Senate, the Assembly concurring, That
the Legislature of the State of California at its 1983-84
Regular Session commencing on the sixth day of
December, 1982, two-thirds of the members elected to
each of the two houses of the Legislature voting therefor,
hereby proposes to the people of the State of California
that the Constitution of the state be amended by
amending Section 16 of Article I thereof, as follows:
SEC. 16. Trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be
secured to all, but in a civil cause three-fourths of the jury
may render a verdict. A jury may be waived in a criminal
cause by the consent of both parties expressed in open
court by the defendant and the defendant's counsel. In a
civil cause a jury may be waived by the consent of the
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M E M 0 R A N D U M

TO:
FROM:
RE:

Members, Senate Judiciary Cornrni ttee
Gene W. Wong
SCA 10 (Presley)--Non-unanimous criminal verdicts

Section 16 of Article 1 of the California Constitution has been
consistently interpreted by the courts to require that jury
verdicts in criminal cases be agreed upon unanimously.
SCA 10
would instead permit a verdict in a non-capital criminal case to
be agreed upon by only five-sixths of the jurors.
Since the California Constitution generally mandates a 12 person
jury for criminal trials, SCA 10 would permit a conviction or
acquittal of the charge by a 10-2 vote.
For misdemeanor trials
where the parties agree upon a lesser number of jurors, SCA 10
would permit a decision by five-sixths of the jurors.
[However,
the minimum constitutionally permissible jury size appears to be
at least seven when the verdict may be decided upon
non-unanimously. Although the parties could agree to a six
member jury and SCA 10 would permit a verdict by five members of
that jury, the United States Supreme Court has held unanimously
that "conviction by a non-unanimous six member jury in a state
criminal trial for a non-petty offense deprives an accused of his
constitutional right to trial by jury." See Burch v. Louisiana
(1979) 441 u.s. 130.)
Except for prohibiting a conviction by five-sixths of a six
member jury, federal constitutional law does not bar a state from
using non-unanimous jury verdicts in criminal cases.
In 1972,
the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue and narrowly
upheld non-unanimous jury verdicts in state criminal trials
against equal protection and due process challenges.
In Johnson
v. Louisiana (1972) 405 U.S. 356, the Court allowed 9-3 verdicts,
B-1

Members, Senate
2

and in Aeocada v.
Both ru!~ngs were

s.

197

to

404

1

2

There are, however,
weighed. Generally,
make four points.
1. Nonunanimity
and retrials

expense of trials
juries.

2. It would resolve the problem of
3. It would reduce the problem

single corrupt juror could no
vote.

juror.
ion since a
deciding

4. It would be more democratic
requirement of
unanimity enables one person to overcome the interest of
others and thwart the major
11.
Those against non-unanimous verdicts have
arguments.

several counter-

1. Change to a non-unanimous
s
or

percentage of
hung cases
because many are dismissed
are pleaded to by
defendant.
would still occur under a non-unan

re-tr
strict attorney or
, hung juries
system.

2. Unanimity is es

1 to
to confidence in our legal
fairness of verdicts.

3. The problem of jury tampering is

warrant preventive measures as
the unanimity principle. Less
available, such as
jury tampering.

f
to
as elimination of
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might have the effect of disenfranchising minority groups
from effective participation in the legal system.

6. Unanimity supports the social decision that it is far
worse to convict an innocent person than to let a guilty
person go free.
This memorandum presents only a brief overview of the issues
raised by SCA 10. For a more complete discussion, please refer
to the attached committee analysis of SCA 10.
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NON-UNANIMOUS JURY VERDICTS
-CRIMINAL CASESHISTORY
Source:

L.A. District Attorney

Prior Legislation:
Support:

SCA 22 (1971) - held in this
committee

CDAA; State Chamber of Commerce; CPOA;
State Sheriffs and Police Chiefs
Ass'n; L.A. Chamber of Commerce; L.A.
County Sheriff; numerous individuals

Opposition:

Attorney General; State Public
Defender; ACLU: CACJ; CTLA;
California Public Defenders Ass'n;
Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n
KEY ISSUE

INSTEAD OF UNANIMOUS VERDICTS, SHOULD ONLY 10 OUT
OF 12 JURORS BE ABLE TO RENDER A VERDICT IN
NON-CAPITAL CRIMINAL CASES?
PURPOSE
The California courts have consistently
interpreted the California Constitution as
requiring that a jury verdict in a criminal case
be agreed to by all 12 jurors.
(More)
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Opponents argued that SCA 10 would
result in a deterioration of justice.
It would short-circuit meaningful
deliberation by juries (see Comment 8),
threaten minority representation on
juries (see Comment 10) , undercut the
DA's burden to prove his case beyond a
reasonable doubt (see Comment 9) ,
undermine public confidence in the
system, could result in the freeing of
guilty offenders, and would not save
significant time or money (see Comment
11) .
Several possible drafting defects were
also noted (see Comment 13).
There are other approaches to the
problem (see Comment 14).
2.

Non-unanimous verdicts permitted by U.S.
Supreme Court
(a)

Johnson and Apodaca
The U.S. Supreme Court considered the
question of whether criminal verdicts
need be unanimous in the cases of Johnson
v. Louisiana (1972) 406 U.S. 356 and
Apodaca v. Oregon (1972) 406 U.S. 404,
and divided 4 to 4 to 1. Justices White,
Burger, Blackmun, and Rehnquist held that
the Constitution did not require a
unanimous' verdict. Justices Stewart,
Brennan, Marshall, and Douglas held that
it did. The final justice, Powell, held
that the 6th Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution did require unanimous
(More)
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unanimous verdict in some felony cases, but
the Legislature has thus far not done so.

4.

History of unanimous verdicts - no impediment
Unanimity has been a part of the common law
tradition for over 600 years. The first case
in which it was recorded that the jury had to
be unanimous was decided in 1367. In the
latter half of the 14th century it became
settled that a verdict had to be unanimous,
and unanimity was an accepted feature of the
common-law jury by the 18th century.
However, according to Professor Alan Scheflin
of the University of Santa Clara Law School,
historical arguments for the unanimity
requirement for the most part are not
conclusive. He stated that the history of the
unanimity rule "is shrouded in mystery," and
that "of the many different theories virtually
none of them apply to the legal procedures
that we have today." He concluded that
historical tradition was not an impediment to
the enactment of this measure.

5.

Number of hung juries -- scant evidence on
subject
Proponents offer SCA 10 as a way of reducing
the "substantial number" of hung juries in
criminal cases.
Unfortunately, there exists
very little empirical data on the number of
hung juries in criminal trials. The following
may, however, give some idea of the scope of
the problem.

(More)
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The study showed that about 8% (136 of
1794) of the juries hung in the CDAA
counties and 9% (30 of 317) in Ventura.
Of those, 41% (56 of 136) were hung 11-1
or 10-2 for guilty in the 20 CDAA
counties and 40% (12 of 30) were hung
11-1 or 10-2 for guilty in Ventura
County. Within that group, about 60% to
67% were hung 11-1 for conviction.
(d)

OC . TP
.
study
A 1975 study ("Empirical Study of
Frequency of Occurrence, Causes, Effects
and Amount of Time Consumed by Hung
Juries" for O.C.J.P. by Planning and
Management Consulting Corp.) shows a
three year aggregate statewide total for
hung juries at 977 of 8,011 jury verdicts
for the period 1970 to 1972, or a rate of
12.1%. Of these cases, 41% were
subsequently dismissed, 33%
plea-bargained, and 26% re-tried at an
estimated cost (in 1975) of $8.7 million.
The study also found that 29.3% of these
cases hung at 11-1 or 10-2 for guilty and
9.6% of them hung at 11-1 of 10-2 for not
guilty.

6.

Substantial cost savings asserted
In Los Angeles one
costs $4,285. The
Attorney estimates
jury trial lasts 4
that by $4,285 and
1981 and 1982, for

day of a felony jury trial
Los Angeles District
that the average felony
days, and then multiplies
by the 393 hung juries in
a total of $6.7 million.
(More)
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This could result in a reduction of the cost
savings from SCA 10.
8.

Effect on jury behavior
Justice Powell and the proponents of this bill
argue that the removal of the unanimity
requirement would minimize the chance that a
jury would be hung by one irrational juror.
District attorneys claim that the irrational
juror is an all too common phenomenon.
A number of former jurors, however, support
the unanimity requirement because of its
effect on the deliberations. The need to
convince every juror results in a more
thorough consideration of the evidence by all
jurors. In contrast the deliberations in the
Apodaca case, in which the defendant was
convicted of assault with a deadly weapon,
burglary in a dwelling, and grand larceny,
lasted only 41 minutes.
A survey of all felony jury verdicts in
Multnomah County (Portland) Oregon which uses
a 10 - 2 system, for a three year period·
ending in 1983 indicates that abolishment of
the unanimity requirement affects jury ·
deliberations and removes motivation for the
jurors to continue deliberating after they
have reached the 10 or 11 votes necessary fo·r
a verdict. That survey shows that only 44% of
the convictions were arrived at unanimously
while 56% were arrived at by either an 11 - 1
or 10 - 2 vote.
WOULD THE DELIBERATIVE PROCESS SUFFER IF
VERDICTS MAY BE REACHED NON-UNANIMOUSLY?
(More)
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panel members of a different race, class, sex
or status.
This argument was rejected by the majority
for two reasons. They first said that while
the Constitution requires the participation
of all groups in the overall jury process, it
does not require the representation of any
particular group on any particular jury, and
thus clearly does not require that a member
of a particular group vote for conviction in
order for that conviction to be valid.
In
addition the majority refused to assume that
a majority of jurors would "deprive a man of
his liberty on the basis of prejudice when a
minority is presenting a reasonable argument
in favor of acquittal."
(Apodaca v. Oregon.)
Justice Powell added briskly that there is a
risk under any system that a jury will fail
to meet its responsibilities, and that he
found nothing in Oregon's experience to
indicate that non-unanimous juries we~e more
irresponsible than others.
11.

Opposition arguments
(a)

Attorney General
In opposing this bill the Attorney
General stated:
Eliminating the traditional
protection of the unanimous jury
verdict is a major and symbolic
departure from one of the most
fundamental principles of our
judicial system. Absent clear
(More)
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And however convenient these
[attacks] may appear at first,
{as doubtless all arbitrary
powers, well ~xecuted, are the
most convenient) yet let it be
again remembered, that delays,
and little inconveniences in the
forms of justice, are the price
that all free nations must pay
for their liberty in more
substantial matters; that these
inroads upon this sacred bulwark
of the nation are fundamentally
opposite to the spirit of our
Constitution; and that, though
begun in trifles, the precedent
may gradually increase and
spread, to the utter disuse of
juries in questions of the most
momentous concern.
(c)

Defense bar
In addition to the arguments
already discussed, the defense
groups also raised the following
arguments at the interim hearing.
(1)

Change to a non-unanimous
system would not result in
great savings of time or
expense. Only a very
small percentage of jury
trials hang (about 12% to
15%) and less than a
majority of those hung
cases were deadlocked 10 2 or 11 - 1. Further, only
(More)
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system still adhere to the
requirement of unanimity.
(7)

12.

Abolition of the unanimity
requirement would create a
precedent for further
dilution of the right to
jury trial.

Bffect on smaller jury
Under existing law, the Constitution permits
parties to a misdemeanor trial to agree to a
jury less than 12. On May 17, this Committee
approved SCA 32 (Boatwright) which would
permit the Legislature to set the number of
jurors in misdemeanor cases at 6 or more.
This bill provides that a verdict could be
rendered by five-sixths of the jury.
However, the minimum constitutionally
permissible jury size appears to be at least
seven when the verdict may be decide~upon
non-unanimously. Although the parties could
agree to a six member jury (or the
Legislature could provide for a 6 person jury
if SCA 32 passes) and SCA 10 would appear to
permit a verdict by five members of that jury
the United States Supreme Court has held
unanimously that "conviction by a
non-unanimous six member jury in a state
criminal trial for a non-petty offense
deprives an accused of his constitutional
right to trial by jury." See Burch v.
Louisiana (1979) 441 U.S. 130.

(More)
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(b)

Unanimous verdicts required for lesser
included offenses
Under existing law, a jury in a first
degree murder case may find the
defendant guilty of a lesser included
offense (second degree murder or
manslaughter) when they are not
convinced on the capital charge.
That practice would continue under
this bill, but the jury would be
required to be in unanimous agreement
on the lesser included offense. A 10
- 2 or 11 - 1 vote would not be
sufficient to return a verdict of
manslaughter in a capital case since
the language of the measure would
require unanimous verdicts in any
criminal action for a capitol offense.
The problem could be resolved by
requiring a unanimous verdict only for
a conviction of first degree murder.

14.

Alternative approaches
(a)

Component in Criminal Court Reform
Initiative
A provision in the Criminal Court
Reform Initiative, which is in the
process of being qualified for the
ballot and which is backed by the
source of SCA 10, would also allow
non-unanimous verdicts in non-capital
cases. However, the language of the
initiative differs from SCA 10. It
(More)
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tq "an ll";"~l system wou"id meet the
proponerttS'" ~prim~£y ~~~ncern since the
chance of two obstinate jurors being
selected for the same jury see~s
remote.
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